### 1nc – Cuba

#### Obama is investing all of his political capital in blocking Iran sanctions – he’s winning the fight and momentum is on his side

**Benen, 1/17/14** – American political writer and blogger, an MSNBC contributor, and a producer for The Rachel Maddow Show (Steve, “Support for new Iran sanctions wanes”

<http://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-show/support-new-iran-sanctions-wanes>)

A week ago, it was practically a foregone conclusion that such a bill would pass the House and Senate; the question is whether President Obama’s veto could be overridden. Just of the last few days, however, the odds of such a bill even reaching the president’s desk have dropped unexpectedly.¶ The Hill, for example, reported yesterday that House Republicans “are moving away from a proposal to adopt new Iran sanctions.” House Democrats who were otherwise sympathetic to the idea became “irked” by GOP political tactics “and the idea appears to have been at least temporarily shelved.”¶ In the Senate, meanwhile, BuzzFeed reports that Sen. Bob Corker (R-Tenn.), a co-sponsor of the legislation, has “proposed the idea of scheduling a vote on Iran sanctions six months from now, after the interim nuclear agreement has run its course, instead of voting on sanctions right now.”¶ In other words, lawmakers could at least wait to see if the talks bear fruit before sabotaging them in advance. Corker’s idea isn’t ideal – it would reportedly lock in the Senate for a vote on July 21, exactly six months after the current deal is implemented, regardless of the status of the diplomacy – but in the larger context it suggests even sanctions supporters are starting to see value in waiting.¶ Indeed, an unnamed senator who supports the sanctions bill told Greg Sargent this week that opponents have the momentum. The senator added, “At the moment, there’s no rush to put the bill on the floor. I’m not aware of any deadline in anyone’s head.”¶ Keep in mind, the sanctions legislation was introduced in the Senate on Dec. 19 with a bipartisan group of 26 sponsors. Over the course of just three weeks, that total more than doubled to 59 sponsors. But the last addition was eight days ago – and no other senators have signed on since.¶ What changed the direction of the debate? To be sure, White House pressure has made a difference, reinforced by President Obama’s direct lobbying to Democratic senators this week. I also talked to a Senate staffer yesterday who said public pressure has also increased, with more voters contacting the Hill with phone calls and emails, voicing opposition to the bill.

#### PC key to block a veto override

**Kampeas, 1/24/14** – Washington, D.C. bureau chief of the Jewish Telegraphic Agency (Ron, Heritage Florida Jewish News, “Iran sanctions have majority backing in Senate, but not enough to override veto”

<http://www.heritagefl.com/story/2014/01/24/news/iran-sanctions-have-majority-backing-in-senate-but-not-enough-to-override-veto/2115.html>

WASHINGTON (JTA)—More than half the United States Senate has signed on to a bill that would intensify sanctions against Iran. But in a sign of the so-far successful effort by the White House to keep the bill from reaching a veto-busting 67 supporters, only 16 Democrats are on board.¶ The number of senators cosponsoring the bill, introduced by Sens. Mark Kirk (R-Ill.) and Robert Menendez (D-N.J.), reached 58 this week, up from just 33 before the Christmas holiday break.¶ Notably only one of the 25 who signed up in recent days—Sen. Michael Bennet (D-Colo.)—is a Democrat, a sign of intense White House lobbying among Democrats to oppose the bill.¶ Backers of the bill say it would strengthen the U.S. hand at the negotiations. But President Obama has said he would veto the bill because it could upend talks now underway between the major powers and Iran aimed at keeping the Islamic Republic from obtaining a nuclear bomb. A similar bill passed this summer by the U.S. House of Representatives had a veto-proof majority.¶ On Thursday, the White House said backers of the bill should be upfront about the fact that it puts the United States on the path to war.¶ “If certain members of Congress want the United States to take military action, they should be up front with the American public and say so,” Bernadette Meehan, the National Security Council spokeswoman, said in a statement posted by The Huffington Post. “Otherwise, it’s not clear why any member of Congress would support a bill that possibly closes the door on diplomacy and makes it more likely that the United States will have to choose between military options or allowing Iran’s nuclear program to proceed.”¶ A number of pro-Israel groups, led by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, are leading a full-court press for the bill’s passage, with prominent Jewish leaders in a number of states making calls and writing letters to holdouts. Dovish Jewish groups such as J Street and Americans for Peace Now oppose the bill.

#### Plan drains PC

LeoGrande, 12

William M. LeoGrande School of Public Affairs American University, Professor of Government and a specialist in Latin American politics and U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America, Professor LeoGrande has been a frequent adviser to government and private sector agencies, 12/18/12, http://www.american.edu/clals/upload/LeoGrande-Fresh-Start.pdf

The Second Obama Administration Where in the executive branch will control over Cuba policy lie? Political considerations played a major role in Obama's Cuba policy during the first term, albeit not as preeminent a consideration as they were during the Clinton years. In 2009, Obama's new foreign policy team got off to a bad start when they promised Senator Menendez that they would consult him before changing Cuba policy. That was the price he extracted for providing Senate Democrats with the 60 votes needed to break a Republican filibuster on a must-pass omnibus appropriations bill to keep the government operating. For the next four years, administration officials worked more closely with Menendez, who opposed the sort of major redirection of policy Obama had promised, than they did with senators like John Kerry (D-Mass.), chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, whose views were more in line with the president's stated policy goals. At the Department of State, Assistant Secretary Arturo Valenzuela favored initiatives to improve relations with Cuba, but he was stymied by indifference or resistance elsewhere in the bureaucracy. Secretary Hillary Clinton, having staked out a tough position Cuba during the Democratic primary campaign, was not inclined to be the driver for a new policy. At the NSC, Senior Director for the Western Hemisphere Dan Restrepo, who advised Obama on Latin America policy during the 2008 campaign, did his best to avoid the Cuba issue because it was so fraught with political danger. When the president finally approved the resumption of people-to-people travel to Cuba, which Valenzuela had been pushing, the White House political team delayed the announcement for several months at the behest of Debbie Wasserman Schultz. Any easing of the travel regulations, she warned, would hurt Democrats' prospects in the upcoming mid-term elections.43 The White House shelved the new regulations until January 2011, and then announced them late Friday before a holiday weekend. Then, just a year later, the administration surrendered to Senator Rubio's demand that it limit the licensing of travel providers in exchange for him dropping his hold on the appointment of Valenzuela's replacement.44 With Obama in his final term and Vice-President Joe Biden unlikely to seek the Democratic nomination in 2016 (unlike the situation Clinton and Gore faced in their second term), politics will presumably play a less central role in deciding Cuba policy over the next four years. There will still be the temptation, however, to sacrifice Cuba policy to mollify congressional conservatives, both Democrat and Republican, who are willing to hold other Obama initiatives hostage to extract concessions on Cuba. And since Obama has given in to such hostage-taking previously, the hostage-takers have a strong incentive to try the same tactic again. The only way to break this cycle would be for the president to stand up to them and refuse to give in, as he did when they attempted to rollback his 2009 relaxation of restrictions on CubanAmerican travel and remittances. Much will depend on who makes up Obama's new foreign policy team, especially at the Department of State. John Kerry has been a strong advocate of a more open policy toward Cuba, and worked behind the scenes with the State Department and USAID to clean up the "democracy promotion" program targeting Cuba, as a way to win the release of Alan Gross. A new secretary is likely to bring new assistant secretaries, providing an opportunity to revitalize the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, which has been thoroughly cowed by congressional hardliners. But even with new players in place, does Cuba rise to the level of importance that would justify a major new initiative and the bruising battle with conservatives on the Hill? Major policy changes that require a significant expenditure of political capital rarely happen unless the urgency of the problem forces policymakers to take action.

#### Sanctions bill causes Israeli strikes

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As 2013 draws to close, the negotiations over the Iranian nuclear program have entered a delicate stage. But in 2014, the tensions will escalate dramatically as a bipartisan group of Senators brings a new Iran sanctions bill to the floor for a vote. As many others have warned, that promise of new measures against Tehran will almost certainly blow up the interim deal reached by the Obama administration and its UN/EU partners in Geneva. But Congress' highly unusual intervention into the President's domain of foreign policy doesn't just make the prospect of an American conflict with Iran more likely. As it turns out, the Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act essentially empowers Israel to decide whether the United States will go to war against Tehran.¶ On their own, the tough new sanctions imposed automatically if a final deal isn't completed in six months pose a daunting enough challenge for President Obama and Secretary of State Kerry. But it is the legislation's commitment to support an Israeli preventive strike against Iranian nuclear facilities that almost ensures the U.S. and Iran will come to blows. As Section 2b, part 5 of the draft mandates:¶ If the Government of Israel is compelled to take military action in legitimate self-defense against Iran's nuclear weapon program, the United States Government should stand with Israel and provide, in accordance with the law of the United States and the constitutional responsibility of Congress to authorize the use of military force, diplomatic, military, and economic support to the Government of Israel in its defense of its territory, people, and existence.¶ Now, the legislation being pushed by Senators Mark Kirk (R-IL), Chuck Schumer (D-NY) and Robert Menendez (D-NJ) does not automatically give the President an authorization to use force should Israel attack the Iranians. (The draft language above explicitly states that the U.S. government must act "in accordance with the law of the United States and the constitutional responsibility of Congress to authorize the use of military force.") But there should be little doubt that an AUMF would be forthcoming from Congressmen on both sides of the aisle. As Lindsey Graham, who with Menendez co-sponsored a similar, non-binding "stand with Israel" resolution in March told a Christians United for Israel (CUFI) conference in July:¶ "If nothing changes in Iran, come September, October, I will present a resolution that will authorize the use of military force to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear bomb."¶ Graham would have plenty of company from the hardest of hard liners in his party. In August 2012, Romney national security adviser and pardoned Iran-Contra architect Elliott Abrams called for a war authorization in the pages of the Weekly Standard. And just two weeks ago, Norman Podhoretz used his Wall Street Journal op-ed to urge the Obama administration to "strike Iran now" to avoid "the nuclear war sure to come."¶ But at the end of the day, the lack of an explicit AUMF in the Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act doesn't mean its supporters aren't giving Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu de facto carte blanche to hit Iranian nuclear facilities. The ensuing Iranian retaliation against to Israeli and American interests would almost certainly trigger the commitment of U.S. forces anyway.¶ Even if the Israelis alone launched a strike against Iran's atomic sites, Tehran will almost certainly hit back against U.S. targets in the Straits of Hormuz, in the region, possibly in Europe and even potentially in the American homeland. Israel would face certain retaliation from Hezbollah rockets launched from Lebanon and Hamas missiles raining down from Gaza.¶ That's why former Bush Defense Secretary Bob Gates and CIA head Michael Hayden raising the alarms about the "disastrous" impact of the supposedly surgical strikes against the Ayatollah's nuclear infrastructure. As the New York Times reported in March 2012, "A classified war simulation held this month to assess the repercussions of an Israeli attack on Iran forecasts that the strike would lead to a wider regional war, which could draw in the United States and leave hundreds of Americans dead, according to American officials." And that September, a bipartisan group of U.S. foreign policy leaders including Brent Scowcroft, retired Admiral William Fallon, former Republican Senator (now Obama Pentagon chief) Chuck Hagel, retired General Anthony Zinni and former Ambassador Thomas Pickering concluded that American attacks with the objective of "ensuring that Iran never acquires a nuclear bomb" would "need to conduct a significantly expanded air and sea war over a prolonged period of time, likely several years." (Accomplishing regime change, the authors noted, would mean an occupation of Iran requiring a "commitment of resources and personnel greater than what the U.S. has expended over the past 10 years in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars combined.") The anticipated blowback?¶ Serious costs to U.S. interests would also be felt over the longer term, we believe, with problematic consequences for global and regional stability, including economic stability. A dynamic of escalation, action, and counteraction could produce serious unintended consequences that would significantly increase all of these costs and lead, potentially, to all-out regional war.

#### An Israeli strike fails, but triggers World War 3, collapses heg and the global economy

**Reuveny, 10** – professor in the School of Public and Environmental Affairs at Indiana University (Rafael, “Unilateral strike could trigger World War III, global depression” Gazette Xtra, 8/7, - See more at: <http://gazettextra.com/news/2010/aug/07/con-unilateral-strike-could-trigger-world-war-iii-/#sthash.ec4zqu8o.dpuf>)

A unilateral Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities would likely have dire consequences, including a regional war, global economic collapse and a major power clash.¶ For an Israeli campaign to succeed, it must be quick and decisive. This requires an attack that would be so overwhelming that Iran would not dare to respond in full force.¶ Such an outcome is extremely unlikely since the locations of some of Iran’s nuclear facilities are not fully known and known facilities are buried deep underground.¶ All of these widely spread facilities are shielded by elaborate air defense systems constructed not only by the Iranians but also the Chinese and, likely, the Russians as well.¶ By now, Iran has also built redundant command and control systems and nuclear facilities, developed early warning systems, acquired ballistic and cruise missiles and upgraded and enlarged its armed forces.¶ Because Iran is well-prepared, a single, conventional Israeli strike—or even numerous strikes—could not destroy all of its capabilities, giving Iran time to respond.¶ Unlike Iraq, whose nuclear program Israel destroyed in 1981, Iran has a second-strike capability comprised of a coalition of Iranian, Syrian, Lebanese, Hezbollah, Hamas, and, perhaps, Turkish forces. Internal pressure might compel Jordan, Egypt and the Palestinian Authority to join the assault, turning a bad situation into a regional war.¶ During the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, at the apex of its power, Israel was saved from defeat by President Nixon’s shipment of weapons and planes. Today, Israel’s numerical inferiority is greater, and it faces more determined and better-equipped opponents. After years of futilely fighting Palestinian irregular armies, Israel has lost some of its perceived superiority—bolstering its enemies’ resolve.¶ Despite Israel’s touted defense systems, Iranian coalition missiles, armed forces, and terrorist attacks would likely wreak havoc on its enemy, leading to a prolonged tit-for-tat.¶ In the absence of massive U.S. assistance, Israel’s military resources may quickly dwindle, forcing it to use its alleged nuclear weapons, as it had reportedly almost done in 1973.¶ An Israeli nuclear attack would likely destroy most of Iran’s capabilities, but a crippled Iran and its coalition could still attack neighboring oil facilities, unleash global terrorism, plant mines in the Persian Gulf and impair maritime trade in the Mediterranean, Red Sea and Indian Ocean.¶ Middle Eastern oil shipments would likely slow to a trickle as production declines due to the war and insurance companies decide to drop their risky Middle Eastern clients. Iran and Venezuela would likely stop selling oil to the United States and Europe.¶ From there, things could deteriorate as they did in the 1930s. The world economy would head into a tailspin; international acrimony would rise; and Iraqi and Afghani citizens might fully turn on the United States, immediately requiring the deployment of more American troops.¶ Russia, China, Venezuela, and maybe Brazil and Turkey—all of which essentially support Iran—could be tempted to form an alliance and openly challenge the U.S. hegemony.¶ Russia and China might rearm their injured Iranian protege overnight, just as Nixon rearmed Israel, and threaten to intervene, just as the U.S.S.R. threatened to join Egypt and Syria in 1973. President Obama’s response would likely put U.S. forces on nuclear alert, replaying Nixon’s nightmarish scenario.¶ Iran may well feel duty-bound to respond to a unilateral attack by its Israeli archenemy, but it knows that it could not take on the United States head-to-head. In contrast, if the United States leads the attack, Iran’s response would likely be muted.¶ If Iran chooses to absorb an American-led strike, its allies would likely protest and send weapons but would probably not risk using force.¶ While no one has a crystal ball, leaders should be risk-averse when choosing war as a foreign policy tool. If attacking Iran is deemed necessary, Israel must wait for an American green light. A unilateral Israeli strike could ultimately spark World War III.

### 1nc – Saudi DA

#### Saudi Arabia has not yet acquired the bomb. Perception of US support is the key factor.

Guzansky ‘13

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Continued Iranian progress toward a nuclear weapon, Iraq's increasing alignment with Tehran, and an expedited U.S. exit from Afghanistan are all changing the Saudi strategic landscape. The Obama administration's "lead from behind" approach in Libya and its hesitation to get involved in the Syrian civil war all contribute to a reassessment of U.S. commitments. With the U.S. "pivot to Asia"—taking the form of a series of military, economic, commercial, and diplomatic initiatives aimed at contending with the rising power of China—and a changing global energy map due to expansion of oil and natural gas production in the United States, Riyadh and others are beginning to prepare for a post-U.S. Middle East.¶ According to recent reports, Washington is considering expanding its nuclear cooperation with Riyadh on the basis of a 2008 memorandum of understanding: In exchange for foregoing the operation of nuclear fuel cycles on its soil, Saudi Arabia was to receive nuclear assistance.[33] Such a move, should it come to pass, may be meant to persuade Riyadh to abandon its strategic goals, prevent other players from gaining a foothold in the attractive Saudi market, and challenge Tehran's nuclear policy. The United States is still Saudi Arabia's most effective security support, but if Washington distances itself from regional matters, the gradual entrance of new players into the Gulf is inevitable.¶ The question of Saudi acquisition of a nuclear deterrent is more relevant than ever when both enemies and friends of the United States are looking at a possible regional drawdown on Washington's part as well as a lack of support for the pro-Western regimes that remain in place. If the U.S. government provides Riyadh with formal security guarantees, it would be natural for it to demand that the kingdom forego its strategic goals. But Riyadh's inclusion under a U.S. defense umbrella is not a given and depends both on the quality of relations between the two countries and other Saudi considerations. Riyadh remains skeptical over Washington's willingness to come to its aid and may thus seek to purchase a nuclear deterrent, which would provide it with more freedom vis-à-vis its stronger ally. Under present circumstances, it is not unreasonable for Riyadh to rely on other states for its defense in addition to Washington for the simple reason that it has done so in the past. Likewise, it is more than likely that the Saudis will not act transparently because they have acted in secret previously.¶ After Iran, Saudi Arabia is the number one candidate for further nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. Open source evidence remains circumstantial, but perhaps more than any other regional player, Riyadh has the requisite ideological and strategic motives as well as the financial wherewithal to act on the option.¶ The kingdom may conclude that its security constraints as well as the attendant prestige and influence generated by having a bomb outweigh the political and economic costs it will pay. The difficulty in stopping Tehran's dogged quest for a nuclear capability coupled with Riyadh's doubts about the reliability of Washington is liable to encourage Riyadh to shorten timetables for developing an independent nuclear infrastructure, as well as to opt to purchase a turnkey nuclear system, an off-the-shelf product, or to enter into a security compact of one sort with another power. Sunni-majority Pakistan has emerged as the natural candidate for such an arrangement.¶ Heavy U.S. pressure is likely to be brought to bear on the Saudis not to acquire nuclear capabilities. Indeed, it seems that, at present, the price Riyadh is likely to pay should it acquire military nuclear capabilities might outweigh the advantages of such a move. But strategic interest, motivated by considerations of survival, could have the upper hand. Should it seem that the kingdom's vital security interests are threatened, it may prefer to take a series of steps, including obtaining a nonconventional arsenal, to reduce risks and ensure the continuity of the House of Saud.

#### Cuban production trades-off with US- Mid-East oil ties

Alhaiji and Maris ‘4

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The current economic, political, and social trends in Cuba indicate that¶ energy consumption will increase substantially in the future. Transition to a¶ market economy would accelerate this trend. In this article the word “transition”¶ refers to any movement towards a market economy. It does not necessarily¶ mean regime change.¶ The proximity of Cuba to the United States and the possibility of massive¶ oil deposits in Cuban waters will have a tangible impact on political, economic,¶ and social environments, not only in Cuba, but in the whole region.¶ The discovery of commercial deposits of oil would affect Cuba’s economy on¶ one hand and US energy policy and energy security on the other. If US-Cuba¶ relations improve in the future, discovery of large oil deposits could affect the¶ energy trade patterns between the two countries and affect oil trade between¶ the US and other oil producing countries, especially in the Middle East.

#### Saudi prolif causes nuclear war.

Edelman ‘11

(Eric –Distinguished Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments & Former U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67162/eric-s-edelman-andrew-f-krepinevich-jr-and-evan-braden-montgomer/the-dangers-of-a-nuclear-iran)

There is, however, at least one state that could receive significant outside support: Saudi Arabia. And if it did, proliferation could accelerate throughout the region. Iran and Saudi Arabia have long been geopolitical and ideological rivals. Riyadh would face tremendous pressure to respond in some form to a nuclear-armed Iran, not only to deter Iranian coercion and subversion but also to preserve its sense that Saudi Arabia is the leading nation in the Muslim world. The Saudi government is already pursuing a nuclear power capability, which could be the first step along a slow road to nuclear weapons development. And concerns persist that it might be able to accelerate its progress by exploiting its close ties to Pakistan. During the 1980s, in response to the use of missiles during the Iran-Iraq War and their growing proliferation throughout the region, Saudi Arabia acquired several dozen css-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles from China. The Pakistani government reportedly brokered the deal, and it may have also offered to sell Saudi Arabia nuclear warheads for the css-2s, which are not accurate enough to deliver conventional warheads effectively. There are still rumors that Riyadh and Islamabad have had discussions involving nuclear weapons, nuclear technology, or security guarantees. This “Islamabad option” could develop in one of several different ways. Pakistan could sell operational nuclear weapons and delivery systems to Saudi Arabia, or it could provide the Saudis with the infrastructure, material, and technical support they need to produce nuclear weapons themselves within a matter of years, as opposed to a decade or longer. Not only has Pakistan provided such support in the past, but it is currently building two more heavy-water reactors for plutonium production and a second chemical reprocessing facility to extract plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. In other words, it might accumulate more fissile material than it needs to maintain even a substantially expanded arsenal of its own. Alternatively, Pakistan might offer an extended deterrent guarantee to Saudi Arabia and deploy nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and troops on Saudi territory, a practice that the United States has employed for decades with its allies. This arrangement could be particularly appealing to both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. It would allow the Saudis to argue that they are not violating the NPT since they would not be acquiring their own nuclear weapons. And an extended deterrent from Pakistan might be preferable to one from the United States because stationing foreign Muslim forces on Saudi territory would not trigger the kind of popular opposition that would accompany the deployment of U.S. troops. Pakistan, for its part, would gain financial benefits and international clout by deploying nuclear weapons in Saudi Arabia, as well as strategic depth against its chief rival, India. The Islamabad option raises a host of difficult issues, perhaps the most worrisome being how India would respond. Would it target Pakistan’s weapons in Saudi Arabia with its own conventional or nuclear weapons? How would this expanded nuclear competition influence stability during a crisis in either the Middle East or South Asia? Regardless of India’s reaction, any decision by the Saudi government to seek out nuclear weapons, by whatever means, would be highly destabilizing. It would increase the incentives of other nations in the Middle East to pursue nuclear weapons of their own. And it could increase their ability to do so by eroding the remaining barriers to nuclear proliferation: each additional state that acquires nuclear weapons weakens the nonproliferation regime, even if its particular method of acquisition only circumvents, rather than violates, the NPT. Were Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons, the Middle East would count three nuclear-armed states, and perhaps more before long. It is unclear how such an n-player competition would unfold because most analyses of nuclear deterrence are based on the U.S.- Soviet rivalry during the Cold War. It seems likely, however, that the interaction among three or more nuclear-armed powers would be more prone to miscalculation and escalation than a bipolar competition. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union only needed to concern themselves with an attack from the other. Multi- polar systems are generally considered to be less stable than bipolar systems because coalitions can shift quickly, upsetting the balance of power and creating incentives for an attack. More important, emerging nuclear powers in the Middle East might not take the costly steps necessary to preserve regional stability and avoid a nuclear exchange. For nuclear-armed states, the bedrock of deterrence is the knowledge that each side has a secure second-strike capability, so that no state can launch an attack with the expectation that it can wipe out its opponents’ forces and avoid a devastating retaliation. However, emerging nuclear powers might not invest in expensive but survivable capabilities such as hardened missile silos or submarine- based nuclear forces. Given this likely vulnerability, the close proximity of states in the Middle East, and the very short flight times of ballistic missiles in the region, any new nuclear powers might be compelled to “launch on warning” of an attack or even, during a crisis, to use their nuclear forces preemptively. Their governments might also delegate launch authority to lower-level commanders, heightening the possibility of miscalculation and escalation. Moreover, if early warning systems were not integrated into robust command-and-control systems, the risk of an unauthorized or accidental launch would increase further still. And without sophisticated early warning systems, a nuclear attack might be unattributable or attributed incorrectly. That is, assuming that the leadership of a targeted state survived a first strike, it might not be able to accurately determine which nation was responsible. And this uncertainty, when combined with the pressure to respond quickly, would create a significant risk that it would retaliate against the wrong party, potentially triggering **a regional nuclear war**. Most existing nuclear powers have taken steps to protect their nuclear weapons from unauthorized use: from closely screening key personnel to developing technical safety measures, such as permissive action links, which require special codes before the weapons can be armed. Yet there is no guarantee that emerging nuclear powers would be willing or able to implement these measures, creating a significant risk that their governments might lose control over the weapons or nuclear material and that nonstate actors could gain access to these items. Some states might seek to mitigate threats to their nuclear arsenals; for instance, they might hide their weapons. In that case, however, a single intelligence compromise could leave their weapons vulnerable to attack or theft. Meanwhile, states outside the Middle East could also be a source of instability. Throughout the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in a nuclear arms race that other nations were essentially powerless to influence. In a multipolar nuclear Middle East, other nuclear powers and states with advanced military technology could influence—for good or ill—the military competition within the region by selling or transferring technologies that most local actors lack today: solid-fuel rocket motors, enhanced missile-guidance systems, war- head miniaturization technology, early warning systems, air and missile defenses. Such transfers could stabilize a fragile nuclear balance if the emerging nuclear powers acquired more survivable arsenals as a result. But they could also be highly destabilizing. If, for example, an outside power sought to curry favor with a potential client state or gain influence with a prospective ally, it might share with that state the technology it needed to enhance the accuracy of its missiles and thereby increase its ability to launch a disarming first strike against any adversary. The ability of existing nuclear powers and other technically advanced military states to shape the emerging nuclear competition in the Middle East could lead to a new Great Game, with unpredictable consequences.

### 1nc – K

#### Globalization makes extinction inevitable- social and environmental factors build positive feedbacks create a cascade of destruction - only massive social reorganization produces sustainable change

**Ehrenfeld, Rutgers biology professor, 2005**

(David, “The Environmental Limits to Globalization”, Conservation Biology Vol. 19 No. 2, ebsco)

Ehrenfeld ‘5,

The overall environmental changes brought about or accelerated by globalization are, however, much easier to describe for the near future, even if the long-term outcomes are still obscure. Climate will continue to change rapidly (Watson 2002); cheap energy and other resources (Youngquist 1997; Hall et al. 2003; Smil 2003), including fresh water (Aldhous 2003; Gleick 2004), will diminish and disappear at an accelerating rate; agricultural and farm communities will deteriorate further while we lose more genetic diversity among crops and farm animals (Fowler & Mooney 1990; Bailey & Lappé 2002; Wirzba 2003); biodiversity will decline faster as terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems are damaged (Heywood 1995); harmful exotic species will become ever more numerous (Mooney & Hobbs 2000); old and new diseases of plants, animals, and humans will continue to proliferate (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 1995-present; Lashley & Durham 2002); and more of the great ocean fisheries will become economically—and occasionally biologically—extinct (Myers & Worm 2003). Although critics have taken issue with many of these forecasts (Lomborg 2001; Hollander 2003), the critics' arguments seem more political than scientific; the data they muster in support of their claims are riddled with errors, significant omissions, and misunderstandings of environmental processes (Orr 2002). Indeed, these environmental changes are demonstrably and frighteningly real. And because of these and related changes, one social prediction can be made with assurance: globalization is creating an environment that will prove hostile to its own survival. This is not a political statement or a moral judgment. It is not the same as saying that globalization ought to be stopped. The enlightened advocates of globalization claim that globalization could give the poorest residents of the poorest countries a chance to enjoy a decent income. And the enlightened opponents of globalization assert that the damage done by globalization to local communities everywhere, and the increasing gap it causes between the rich and the poor, far outweigh the small amount of good globalization may do. The debate is vitally important, but the fate of globalization is unlikely to be determined by who wins it. Al Gore remarked about the political impasse over global warming and the current rapid melting of the world's glaciers: “Glaciers don't give a damn about politics. They just reflect reality” (Herbert 2004). The same inexorable environmental reality is even now drawing the curtains on globalization. Often minimized in the United States, this reality is already painfully obvious in China, which is experiencing the most rapid expansion related to globalization. Nearly every issue of China Daily, the national English-language newspaper, features articles on the environmental effects of globalization. Will efforts in China to rein in industrial expansion, energy consumption, and environmental pollution succeed (Fu 2004; Qin 2004; Xu 2004)? Will the desperate attempts of Chinese authorities to mitigate the impact of rapid industrialization on the disastrously scarce supplies of fresh water be effective (Li 2004; Liang 2004)? The environmental anxiety is palpable and pervasive. The environmental effects of globalization cannot be measured by simple numbers like the gross domestic product or unemployment rate. But even without such summary statistics, there are so many examples of globalization's impact, some obvious, some less so, that a convincing argument about its effects and trends can be made. Among the environmental impacts of globalization, perhaps the most significant is its fostering of the excessive use of energy, with the attendant consequences. This surge in energy use was inevitable, once the undeveloped four-fifths of the world adopted the energy-wasting industrialization model of the developed fifth, and as goods that once were made locally began to be transported around the world at a tremendous cost of energy. China's booming production, largely the result of its surging global exports, has caused a huge increase in the mining and burning of coal and the building of giant dams for more electric power, an increase of power that in only the first 8 months of 2003 amounted to 16% (Bradsher 2003; Guo 2004). The many environmental effects of the coal burning include, most importantly, global warming. Fossil-fuel-driven climate change seems likely to result in a rise in sea level, massive extinction of species, agricultural losses from regional shifts in temperature and rainfall, and, possibly, alteration of major ocean currents, with secondary climatic change. Other side effects of coal burning are forest decline, especially from increased nitrogen deposition; acidification of freshwater and terrestrial ecosystems from nitrogen and sulfur compounds; and a major impact on human health from polluted air. Dams, China's alternative method of producing electricity without burning fossil fuels, themselves cause massive environmental changes. These changes include fragmentation of river channels; loss of floodplains, riparian zones, and adjacent wetlands; deterioration of irrigated terrestrial environments and their surface waters; deterioration and loss of river deltas and estuaries; aging and reduction of continental freshwater runoff to oceans; changes in nutrient cycling; impacts on biodiversity; methylmercury contamination of food webs; and greenhouse gas emissions from reservoirs. The impoundment of water in reservoirs at high latitudes in the northern hemisphere has even caused a small but measurable increase in the speed of the earth's rotation and a change in the planet's axis (Rosenberg et al. 2000; Vörösmarty & Sahagian 2000). Moreover, the millions of people displaced by reservoirs such as the one behind China's Three Gorges Dam have their own environmental impacts as they struggle to survive in unfamiliar and often unsuitable places. Despite the importance of coal and hydropower in China's booming economy, the major factor that enables globalization to flourish around the world—even in China—is still cheap oil. Cheap oil runs the ships, planes, trucks, cars, tractors, harvesters, earth-moving equipment, and chain saws that globalization needs; cheap oil lifts the giant containers with their global cargos off the container ships onto the waiting flatbeds; cheap oil even mines and processes the coal, grows and distills the biofuels, drills the gas wells, and builds the nuclear power plants while digging and refining the uranium ore that keeps them operating. Paradoxically, the global warming caused by this excessive burning of oil is exerting negative feedback on the search for more oil to replace dwindling supplies. The search for Arctic oil has been slowed by recent changes in the Arctic climate. Arctic tundra has to be frozen and snow-covered to allow the heavy seismic vehicles to prospect for underground oil reserves, or long-lasting damage to the landscape results. The recent Arctic warming trend has reduced the number of days that vehicles can safely explore: from 187 in 1969 to 103 in 2002 (Revkin 2004). Globalization affects so many environmental systems in so many ways that negative interactions of this sort are frequent and usually unpredictable. Looming over the global economy is the imminent disappearance of cheap oil. There is some debate about when global oil production will peak—many of the leading petroleum geologists predict the peak will occur in this decade, possibly in the next two or three years (Campbell 1997; Kerr 1998; Duncan & Youngquist 1999; Holmes & Jones 2003; Appenzeller 2004; ASPO 2004; Bakhtiari 2004; Gerth 2004)—but it is abundantly clear that the remaining untapped reserves and alternatives such as oil shale, tar sands, heavy oil, and biofuels are economically and energetically no substitute for the cheap oil that comes pouring out of the ground in the Arabian Peninsula and a comparatively few other places on Earth (Youngquist 1997). Moreover, the hydrogen economy and other high-tech solutions to the loss of cheap oil are clouded by serious, emerging technological doubts about feasibility and safety, and a realistic fear that, if they can work, they will not arrive in time to rescue our globalized industrial civilization (Grant 2003; Tromp et al. 2003; Romm 2004). Even energy conservation, which we already know how to implement both technologically and as part of an abstemious lifestyle, is likely to be no friend to globalization, because it reduces consumption of all kinds, and consumption is what globalization is all about. In a keynote address to the American Geological Society, a noted expert on electric power networks, Richard Duncan (2001), predicted widespread, permanent electric blackouts by 2012, and the end of industrial, globalized civilization by 2030. The energy crunch is occurring now. According to Duncan, per capita energy production in the world has already peaked—that happened in 1979—and has declined since that date. In a more restrained evaluation of the energy crisis, Charles Hall and colleagues (2003) state that: The world is not about to run out of hydrocarbons, and perhaps it is not going to run out of oil from unconventional sources any time soon. What will be difficult to obtain is cheap petroleum, because what is left is an enormous amount of low-grade hydrocarbons, which are likely to be much more expensive financially, energetically, politically and especially environmentally. Nuclear power still has “important…technological, economic, environmental and public safety problems,” they continue, and at the moment “renewable energies present a mixed bag of opportunities.” Their solution? Forget about the more expensive and dirtier hydrocarbons such as tar sands. We need a major public policy intervention to foster a crash program of public and private investment in research on renewable energy technologies. Perhaps this will happen—necessity does occasionally bring about change. But I do not see renewable energy coming in time or in sufficient magnitude to save globalization. Sunlight, wind, geothermal energy, and biofuels, necessary as they are to develop, cannot replace cheap oil at the current rate of use without disastrous environmental side effects. These renewable alternatives can only power a nonglobalized civilization that consumes less energy (Ehrenfeld 2003b). Already, as the output of the giant Saudi oil reserves has started to fall (Gerth 2004) and extraction of the remaining oil is becoming increasingly costly, oil prices are climbing and the strain is being felt by other energy sources. For example, the production of natural gas, which fuels more than half of U.S. homes, is declining in the United States, Canada, and Mexico as wells are exhausted. In both the United States and Canada, intensive new drilling is being offset by high depletion rates, and gas consumption increases yearly. In 2002 the United States imported 15% of its gas from Canada, more than half of Canada's total gas production. However, with Canada's gas production decreasing and with the “stranded” gas reserves in the United States and Canadian Arctic regions unavailable until pipelines are built 5–10 years from now, the United States is likely to become more dependent on imported liquid natural gas (LNG). Here are some facts to consider. Imports of LNG in the United States increased from 39 billion cubic feet in 1990 to 169 billion cubic feet in 2002, which was still <1% of U.S. natural gas consumption. The largest natural gas field in the world is in the tiny Persian Gulf state of Qatar. Gas is liquefied near the site of production by cooling it to −260°F (−162°C), shipped in special refrigerated trains to waiting LNG ships, and then transported to an LNG terminal, where it is off-loaded, regasified, and piped to consumers. Each LNG transport ship costs a half billion dollars. An LNG terminal costs one billion dollars. There are four LNG terminals in the United States, none in Canada or Mexico. Approximately 30 additional LNG terminal sites to supply the United States are being investigated or planned, including several in the Bahamas, with pipelines to Florida. On 19 January 2004, the LNG terminal at Skikda, Algeria, blew up with tremendous force, flattening much of the port and killing 30 people. The Skikda terminal, renovated by Halliburton in the late 1990s, will cost $800 million to $1 billion to replace. All major ports in the United States are heavily populated, and there is strong environmental opposition to putting terminals at some sites in the United States. Draw your own conclusions about LNG as a source of cheap energy (Youngquist & Duncan 2003; Romero 2004). From LNG to coal gasification to oil shale to nuclear fission to breeder reactors to fusion to renewable energy, even to improvements in efficiency of energy use (Browne 2004), our society looks from panacea to panacea to feed the ever-increasing demands of globalization. But no one solution or combination of solutions will suffice to meet this kind of consumption. In the words of Vaclav Smil (2003): Perhaps the evolutionary imperative of our species is to ascend a ladder of ever-increasing energy throughputs, never to consider seriously any voluntary consumption limits and stay on this irrational course until it will be too late to salvage the irreplaceable underpinnings of biospheric services that will be degraded and destroyed by our progressing use of energy and materials. Among the many other environmental effects of globalization, one that is both obvious and critically important is reduced genetic and cultural diversity in agriculture. As the representatives of the petrochemical and pharmaceutical industries' many subsidiary seed corporations sell their patented seeds in more areas previously isolated from global trade, farmers are dropping their traditional crop varieties, the reservoir of our accumulated genetic agricultural wealth, in favor of a few, supposedly high-yielding, often chemical-dependent seeds. The Indian agricultural scientist H. Sudarshan (2002) has provided a typical example. He noted that Over the last half century, India has probably grown over 30,000 different, indigenous varieties or landraces of rice. This situation has, in the last 20 years, changed drastically and it is predicted that in another 20 years, rice diversity will be reduced to 50 varieties, with the top 10 accounting for over three-quarters of the sub-continent's rice acreage. With so few varieties left, where will conventional plant breeders and genetic engineers find the genes for disease and pest resistance, environmental adaptations, and plant quality and vigor that we will surely need? A similar loss has been seen in varieties of domestic animals. Of the 3831 breeds of ass, water buffalo, cattle, goat, horse, pig, and sheep recorded in the twentieth century, at least 618 had become extinct by the century's end, and 475 of the remainder were rare. Significantly, the countries with the highest ratios of surviving breeds per million people are those that are most peripheral and remote from global commerce (Hall & Ruane 1993). Unfortunately, with globalization, remoteness is no longer tenable. Here is a poignant illustration. Rural Haitians have traditionally raised a morphotype of long-snouted, small black pig known as the Creole pig. Adapted to the Haitian climate, Creole pigs had very low maintenance requirements, and were mainstays of soil fertility and the rural economy. In 1982 and 1983, most of these pigs were deliberately killed as part of swine disease control efforts required to integrate Haiti into the hemispheric economy. They were replaced by pigs from Iowa that needed clean drinking water, roofed pigpens, and expensive, imported feed. The substitution was a disaster. Haitian peasants, the hemisphere's poorest, lost an estimated $600 million. Haiti's ousted President Jean-Bertrand Aristide (2000), who, whatever his faults, understood the environmental and social effects of globalization, wrote There was a 30% drop in enrollment in rural schools… a dramatic decline in the protein consumption in rural Haiti, a devastating decapitalization of the peasant economy and an incalculable negative impact on Haiti's soil and agricultural productivity. The Haitian peasantry has not recovered to this day…. For many peasants the extermination of the Creole pigs was their first experience of globalization. The sale of Mexican string beans and South African apples in Michigan and Minnesota in January is not without consequences. The globalization of food has led to the introduction of “high-input” agricultural methods in many less-developed countries, with sharply increasing use of fertilizers, insecticides, herbicides, fungicides, irrigation pumps, mechanical equipment, and energy. There has been a correspondingly sharp decline in farmland biodiversity—including birds, invertebrates, and wild crop relatives—much of which is critically important to agriculture through ecosystem services or as reservoirs of useful genes (Benton et al. 2003). The combination of heavy fertilizer use along with excessive irrigation has resulted in toxic accumulations of salt, nitrates, and pesticides ruining soils all over the world, along with the dangerous drawdown and contamination of underground reserves of fresh water (Hillel 1991; Kaiser 2004; Sugden et al. 2004). Although population growth has been responsible for some of this agricultural intensification, much has been catalyzed by globalization (Wright 1990). Aquaculture is another agriculture-related activity. Fish and shellfish farming—much of it for export—has more than doubled in the past 15 years. This industry's tremendous requirements for fish meal and fish oil to use as food and its degradation of coastal areas are placing a great strain on marine ecosystems (Naylor et al. 2000). Other unanticipated problems are occurring. For instance, the Scottish fisheries biologist Alexander Murray and his colleagues (2002) report that infectious salmon anemia … is caused by novel virulent strains of a virus that has adapted to intensive aquacultural practices and has exploited the associated [ship] traffic to spread both locally and internationally…. Extensive ship traffic and lack of regulation increase the risk of spreading disease to animals raised for aquaculture and to other animals in marine environments…. [and underscore] the potential role of shipping in the global transport of zoonotic pathogens. The reduction of diversity in agriculture is paralleled by a loss and reshuffling of wild species. The global die-off of species now occurring, unprecedented in its rapidity, is of course only partly the result of globalization, but globalization is a major factor in many extinctions. It accelerates species loss in several ways. First, it increases the numbers of exotic species carried by the soaring plane, ship, rail, and truck traffic of global trade. Second, it is responsible for the adverse effects of ecotourism on wild flora and fauna (Ananthaswamy 2004). And third, it promotes the development and exploitation of populations and natural areas to satisfy the demands of global trade, including, in addition to the agricultural and energy-related disruptions already mentioned, logging, over-fishing of marine fisheries, road building, and mining. To give just one example, from 1985 to 2001, 56% of Indonesian Borneo's (Kalimantan) “protected” lowland forest areas—many of them remote and sparsely populated—were intensively logged, primarily to supply international timber markets (Curran et al. 2004). Surely one of the most significant impacts of globalization on wild species and the ecosystems in which they live has been the increase in introductions of invasive species (Vitousek et al. 1996; Mooney & Hobbs 2000). Two examples are zebra mussels (Dreissena polymorpha), which came to the Great Lakes in the mid-1980s in the ballast water of cargo ships from Europe, and Asian longhorn beetles (Anoplophera glabripennis), which arrived in the United States in the early 1990s in wood pallets and crates used to transfer cargo shipped from China and Korea. Zebra mussels, which are eliminating native mussels and altering lake ecosystems, clog the intake pipes of waterworks and power plants. The Asian longhorn beetle now seems poised to cause heavy tree loss (especially maples [Acer sp.]) in the hardwood forests of eastern North America. Along the U.S. Pacific coast, oaks (Quercus sp.) and tanoaks (Lithocarpus densiflorus) are being killed by sudden oak death, caused by a new, highly invasive fungal disease organism (Phytophthora ramorum), which is probably also an introduced species that was spread by the international trade in horticultural plants (Rizzo & Garbelotto 2003). Estimates of the annual cost of the damage caused by invasive species in the United States range from $5.5 billion to $115 billion. The zebra mussel alone, just one of a great many terrestrial, freshwater, and marine exotic animals, plants, and pathogens, has been credited with more than $5 billion of damage since its introduction (Mooney & Drake 1986; Cox 1999). Invasive species surely rank among the principal economic and ecological limiting factors for globalization. Some introduced species directly affect human health, either as vectors of disease or as the disease organisms themselves. For example, the Asian tiger mosquito (Aedes albopictus), a vector for dengue and yellow fevers, St. Louis and LaCrosse encephalitis viruses, and West Nile virus, was most likely introduced in used truck tires imported from Asia to Texas in the 1980s and has spread widely since then. Discussion of this and other examples is beyond the scope of this article. Even the partial control of accidental and deliberate species introductions requires stringent, well-funded governmental regulation in cooperation with the public and with business. Many introductions of alien species cannot be prevented, but some can, and successful interventions to prevent the spread of introduced species can have significant environmental and economic benefits. To give just one example, western Australia has shown that government and industry can cooperate to keep travelers and importers from bringing harmful invasive species across their borders. The western Australian HortGuard and GrainGuard programs integrate public education; rapid and effective access to information; targeted surveillance, which includes preborder, border, and postborder activities; and farm and regional biosecurity systems (Sharma 2004). Similar programs exist in New Zealand. But there is only so much that governments can do in the face of massive global trade. Some of the significant effects of globalization on wildlife are quite subtle. Mazzoni et al. (2003) reported that the newly appearing fungal disease chytridiomycosis (caused by Batrachochytrium dendrobatidis), which appears to be the causative agent for a number of mass die-offs and extinctions of amphibians on several continents, is probably being spread by the international restaurant trade in farmed North American bullfrogs (Rana catesbeiana). These authors state: “Our findings suggest that international trade may play a key role in the global dissemination of this and other emerging infectious diseases of wildlife.” Even more unexpected findings were described in 2002 by Alexander et al., who noted that expansion of ecotourism and other consequences of globalization are increasing contact between free-ranging wildlife and humans, resulting in the first recorded introduction of a primary human pathogen, Mycobacterium tuberculosis, into wild populations of banded mongooses (Mungos mungo) in Botswana and suricates (Suricata suricatta) in South Africa. The known effects of globalization on the environment are numerous and highly significant. Many others are undoubtedly unknown. Given these circumstances, the first question that suggests itself is: Will globalization, as we see it now, remain a permanent state of affairs (Rees 2002; Ehrenfeld 2003a)? The principal environmental side effects of globalization—climate change, resource exhaustion (particularly cheap energy), damage to agroecosystems, and the spread of exotic species, including pathogens (plant, animal, and human)—are sufficient to make this economic system unstable and short-lived. The socioeconomic consequences of globalization are likely to do the same. In my book The Arrogance of Humanism (1981), I claimed that our ability to manage global systems, which depends on our being able to predict the results of the things we do, or even to understand the systems we have created, has been greatly exaggerated. Much of our alleged control is science fiction; it doesn't work because of theoretical limits that we ignore at our peril. We live in a dream world in which reality testing is something we must never, never do, lest we awake. In 1984 Charles Perrow explored the reasons why we have trouble predicting what so many of our own created systems will do, and why they surprise us so unpleasantly while we think we are managing them. In his book Normal Accidents, which does not concern globalization, he listed the critical characteristics of some of today's complex systems. They are highly interlinked, so a change in one part can affect many others, even those that seem quite distant. Results of some processes feed back on themselves in unexpected ways. The controls of the system often interact with each other unpredictably. We have only indirect ways of finding out what is happening inside the system. And we have an incomplete understanding of some of the system's processes. His example of such a system is a nuclear power plant, and this, he explained, is why system-wide accidents in nuclear plants cannot be predicted or eliminated by system design. I would argue that globalization is a similar system, also subject to catastrophic accidents, many of them environmental—events that we cannot define until after they have occurred, and perhaps not even then. The comparatively few commentators who have predicted the collapse of globalization have generally given social reasons to support their arguments. These deserve some consideration here, if only because the environmental and social consequences of globalization interact so strongly with each other. In 1998, the British political economist John Gray, giving scant attention to environmental factors, nevertheless came to the conclusion that globalization is unstable and will be short-lived. He said, “There is nothing in today's global market that buffers it against the social strains arising from highly uneven economic development within and between the world's diverse societies.” The result, Gray states, is that “The combination of [an] unceasing stream of new technologies, unfettered market competition and weak or fractured social institutions” has weakened both sovereign states and multinational corporations in their ability to control important events. Note that Gray claims that not only nations but also multinational corporations, which are widely touted as controlling the world, are being weakened by globalization. This idea may come as a surprise, considering the growth of multinationals in the past few decades, but I believe it is true. Neither governments nor giant corporations are even remotely capable of controlling the environmental or social forces released by globalization, without first controlling globalization itself. Two of the social critics of globalization with the most dire predictions about its doom are themselves masters of the process. The late Sir James Goldsmith, billionaire financier, wrote in 1994, It must surely be a mistake to adopt an economic policy which makes you rich if you eliminate your national workforce and transfer production abroad, and which bankrupts you if you continue to employ your own people…. It is the poor in the rich countries who will subsidize the rich in the poor countries. This will have a serious impact on the social cohesion of nations. Another free-trade billionaire, George Soros, said much the same thing in 1995: “The collapse of the global marketplace would be a traumatic event with unimaginable consequences. Yet I find it easier to imagine than the continuation of the present regime.” How much more powerful these statements are if we factor in the environment! As globalization collapses, what will happen to people, biodiversity, and ecosystems? With respect to people, the gift of prophecy is not required to answer this question. What will happen depends on where you are and how you live. Many citizens of the Third World are still comparatively self-sufficient; an unknown number of these will survive the breakdown of globalization and its attendant chaos. In the developed world, there are also people with resources of self-sufficiency and a growing understanding of the nature of our social and environmental problems, which may help them bridge the years of crisis. Some species are adaptable; some are not. For the nonhuman residents of Earth, not all news will be bad. Who would have predicted that wild turkeys (Meleagris gallopavo), one of the wiliest and most evasive of woodland birds, extinct in New Jersey 50 years ago, would now be found in every county of this the most densely populated state, and even, occasionally, in adjacent Manhattan? Who would have predicted that black bears (Ursus americanus), also virtually extinct in the state in the mid-twentieth century, would now number in the thousands (Ehrenfeld 2001)? Of course these recoveries are unusual—rare bright spots in a darker landscape. Finally, a few ecological systems may survive in a comparatively undamaged state; most will be stressed to the breaking point, directly or indirectly, by many environmental and social factors interacting unpredictably. Lady Luck, as always, will have much to say. In his book The Collapse of Complex Societies, the archaeologist Joseph Tainter (1988) notes that collapse, which has happened to all past empires, inevitably results in human systems of lower complexity and less specialization, less centralized control, lower economic activity, less information flow, lower population levels, less trade, and less redistribution of resources. All of these changes are inimical to globalization. This less-complex, less-globalized condition is probably what human societies will be like when the dust settles. I do not think, however, that we can make such specific predictions about the ultimate state of the environment after globalization, because we have never experienced anything like this exceptionally rapid, global environmental damage before. History and science have little to tell us in this situation. The end of the current economic system and the transition to a postglobalized state is and will be accompanied by a desperate last raid on resources and a chaotic flurry of environmental destruction whose results cannot possibly be told in advance. All one can say is that the surviving species, ecosystems, and resources will be greatly impoverished compared with what we have now, and our descendants will not thank us for having adopted, however briefly, an economic system that consumed their inheritance and damaged their planet so wantonly. Environment is a true bottom line—concern for its condition must trump all purely economic growth strategies if both the developed and developing nations are to survive and prosper. Awareness of the environmental limits that globalized industrial society denies or ignores should not, however, bring us to an extreme position of environmental determinism. Those whose preoccupations with modern civilization's very real social problems cause them to reject or minimize the environmental constraints discussed here (Hollander 2003) are guilty of seeing only half the picture. Environmental scientists sometimes fall into the same error. It is tempting to see the salvation of civilization and environment solely in terms of technological improvements in efficiency of energy extraction and use, control of pollution, conservation of water, and regulation of environmentally harmful activities. But such needed developments will not be sufficient—or may not even occur—without corresponding social change, including an end to human population growth and the glorification of consumption, along with the elimination of economic mechanisms that increase the gap between rich and poor. The environmental and social problems inherent in globalization are completely interrelated—any attempt to treat them as separate entities is unlikely to succeed in easing the transition to a postglobalized world. Integrated change that combines environmental awareness, technological innovation, and an altered world view is the only answer to the life-threatening problems exacerbated by globalization (Ehrenfeld 2003b).

#### Our alternative is to decolonize economic engagement. Questioning the politics of space and knowledge that make engagement an economic tool of manipulation is key to sustainable development.

**Walsh, Estudios Culturales Latinoamericanos de la Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar, 2012**

(Catherine, “The Politics of Naming”, Cultural Studies, 26.1, Project Muse)

Cultural Studies, in our project, is constructed and understood as more than a field of ‘study’. It is broadly understand as a formation, a field of possibility and expression. And it is constructed as a space of encounter between disciplines and intellectual, political and ethical projects that seek to combat what Alberto Moreiras called the impoverishment of thought driven by divisions (disciplinary, epistemological, geographic, etc.) and the socio-political-cultural fragmentation that increasingly makes social change and intervention appear to be divided forces (Moreiras 2001). As such, Cultural Studies is conceived as a place of plural-, inter-, transand in-disciplinary (or undisciplined) critical thinking that takes as major concern the intimate relationships between culture, knowledge, politics and economics mentioned earlier, and that sees the problems of the region as both local and global. It is a space from which to search for ways of thinking, knowing, comprehending, feeling and acting that permit us to intervene and influence: a field that makes possible convergence and articulation, particularly between efforts, practices, knowledge and projects that focus on more global justice, on differences (epistemic, ontological, existential, of gender, ethnicity, class, race, nation, among others) constructed as inequalities within the framework of neo-liberal capitalism. It is a place that seeks answers, encourages intervention and engenders projects and proposals. It is in this frame of understanding and practice in our Ph.D. programme in Latin-American Cultural Studies at the Universidad Andina Simo´n Bolı´var, that this broad description-definition continues to take on more concrete characteristics. Here I can identify three that stand out: the inter-cultural, the inter-epistemic and the de-colonial. The inter-cultural has been and still is a central axis in the struggles and processes of social change in the Andean region. Its critical meaning was first affirmed near the end of the 1980s in the Ecuadorian indigenous movement’s political project. Here inter-culturality was positioned as an ideological principal grounded in the urgent need for a radical transformation of social structures, institutions and relationships, not only for indigenous peoples but also for society as a whole. Since then, inter-culturality has marked a social, political, ethical project and process that is also epistemological;6 a project and a process that seek to re-found the bases of the nation and national culture, understood as homogenous and mono-cultural. Such call for re-founding does not to simply add diversity to what is already established, but rather to rethink, rebuild and inter-culturalize the nation and national culture, and with in the terrains of knowledge, politics and life-based visions. It is this understanding of the inter-cultural that is of interest. Concretely, we are interested in the spaces of agency, creation, innovation and encounter between and among different subjects, knowledges, practices and visions. Referring to our project of Cultural Studies as (inter)Cultural Studies, enables and encourages us to think from this region, from the struggles, practices and processes that question Eurocentric, colonial and imperial legacies, and work to transform and create radically different conditions for thinking, encountering, being and coexisting or co-living. In a similar fashion, the inter-epistemic focuses on the need to question, interrupt and transgress the Euro-USA-centric epistemological frameworks that dominate Latin-American universities and even some Cultural Studies programmes. To think with knowledges produced in Latin America and the Caribbean (as well as in other ‘Souths’, including those located in the North) and by intellectuals who come not only from academia, but also from other projects, communities and social movements are, for us, a necessary and essential step, both in de-colonization and in creating other conditions of knowledge and understanding. Our project, thus, concerns itself with the work of inverting the geopolitics of knowledge, with placing attention on the historically subjugated and negated plurality of knowledge, logics and rationalities, and with the political-intellectual effort to create relationships, articulations and convergences between them. The de-colonial element is intimately related to the two preceding points. Here our interest is, on one hand, to make evident the thoughts, practices and experiences that both in the past and in the present have endeavoured to challenge the colonial matrix of power and domination, and to exist in spite of it, in its exterior and interior. By colonial matrix, we refer to the hierarchical system of racial civilizational classification that has operated and operates at different levels of life, including social identities (the superiority of white, heterosexual males), ontological-existential contexts (the dehumanization of indigenous and black peoples), epistemic contexts (the positioning of Euro-centrism as the only perspective of knowledge, thereby disregarding other epistemic rationalities), and cosmological (the control and/or negation of the ancestral-spiritual-territorial-existential bases that govern the life-systems of ancestral peoples, most especially those of African Diaspora and of Abya Yala) (see Quijano 1999). At the centre or the heart of this matrix is capitalism as the only possible model of civilization; the imposed social classification, the idea of ‘humanity’, the perspective of knowledge and the prototype life-system that goes with it defines itself through this capitalistic civilizational lens. As Quijano argues, by defending the interests of social domination and the exploitation of work under the hegemony of capital, ‘the ‘‘racialization’’ and the ‘‘capitalization’’ of social relationships of these models of power, and the ‘‘eurocentralization’’ of its control, are in the very roots of our present problems of identity,’ in Latin America as countries, ‘nations’ and States (Quijano 2006). It is precisely because of this that we consider the de-colonial to be a fundamental perspective. Within our project, the de-colonial does not seek to establish a new paradigm or line of thought but a critically-conscious understanding of the past and present that opens up and suggests questions, perspectives and paths to explore. As such, and on the other hand, we are interested in stimulating methodologies and pedagogies that, in the words of Jacqui Alexander (2005), cross the fictitious boundaries of exclusion and marginalization to contribute to the configuration of new ways of being and knowing rooted not in alterity itself, but in the principles of relation, complement and commitment. It is also to encourage other ways of reading, investigating and researching, of seeing, knowing, feeling, hearing and being, that challenge the singular reasoning of western modernity, make tense our own disciplinary frameworks of ‘study’ and interpretation, and persuade a questioning from and with radically distinct rationalities, knowledge, practices and civilizational-life-systems. It is through these three pillars of the inter-cultural, the inter-epistemic and the de-colonial that we attempt to understand the processes, experiences and struggles that are occurring in Latin America and elsewhere. But it is also here that we endeavour to contribute to and learn from the complex relationships between culture-politics-economics, knowledge and power in the world today; to unlearn to relearn from and with perspectives otherwise. Practices, experiences and challenges In this last section, my interest is to share some of the particularities of our doctorate programme/project, now in its third cycle; its achievements and advancements; and the challenges that it faces in an academic context, increasingly characterized regionally and internationally, by disciplinarity, depolitization, de-subjectivation, apathy, competitive individualism and nonintervention. Without a doubt, one of the unique characteristics of the programme/ project is its students: all mid-career professionals mainly from the Andean region and from such diverse fields as the social sciences, humanities, the arts, philosophy, communication, education and law. The connection that the majority of the students have with social and cultural movements and/or processes, along with their dedication to teaching or similar work, helps to contribute to dynamic debate and discussion not always seen in academia and post-graduate programmes. Similarly, the faculty of the programme stand out for being internationally renowned intellectuals, and, the majority, for their commitment to struggles of social transformation, critical thinking and the project of the doctorate itself. The curriculum offering is based on courses and seminars that seek to foment thinking from Latin American and with its intellectuals in all of their diversity comprehend, confront and affect the problems and realities of the region, which are not only local but global. The pedagogical methodological perspective aforementioned works to stimulate processes of collective thought and allow the participants to think from related formations, experiences and research topics and to think with the differences disciplinary, geographical, epistemic and subjective thereby fracturing individualism by dialoguing, transgressing and inter-crossing boundaries. Trans-disciplinarity, as such, is a fundamental position and process in our project. The fact that the graduate students come from an array of different backgrounds provides a plurality in which the methodologicalpedagogical practice becomes the challenge of collectively thinking, crossing disciplinary backgrounds and creating new positions and perspectives, conceived and formed in a trans-disciplinary way. The majority of courses, seminars and professors, also assume that this is a necessary challenge in today’s world when no single discipline and no single intellectual is capable alone of analyzing, comprehending or transforming social reality. Nevertheless, trans-disciplinary gains continue to be a point of criticism and contention, especially given the present trend to re-discipline the LatinAmerican university. As Edgardo Lander has argued (2000a), this tendency reflects the neo-liberalization of higher education, as well as the increasing conservatism of intellectuals, including those that previously identified as or to continue to identify themselves as progressives and/or leftists. To establish oneself in a discipline or presume truth through a discipline, a common practice today, is to reinstall the geopolitics of knowing. This, in turn, strengthens Euro-USA-centrism as ‘the place’ of theory and knowledge. As such, the subject of dispute is not simply the trans-disciplinary aspect of Cultural Studies but also its ‘indisciplinary’ nature, that is, the effort central to our project to include points of view that come from Latin America and thinkers who are not always connected to academia (see Walsh et al. 2002). Our interest is not, as some claim, to facilitate the agendas or cultural agency of subaltern groups or social movements, promote activism or simply include other knowledge forms, but instead to build a different political-intellectual project a political-intellectual project otherwise. Such project gives centrality to the need to learn to think from, together and with LatinAmerican reality and its actors, thereby stimulating convergences, articulations and inter-culturalizations that aim at creating an academia that is committed to life itself. Such a perspective does not eliminate or deny knowledge conceived in Europe or North America usually named as ‘universal’ or its proponents and thinkers. Instead, it incorporates such knowledge as part of a broader canon and worldview that seeks pluriversality, recognizing the importance of places and loci of enunciation. For our project, all of this serves to highlight the doubly complicated situation that is still in flux. On one hand, there is the negative association with trans-disciplinarity and the academic suppositions that accompany it, particularly in the area of research; this requires that our theses be doubly rigorous. And, on the other hand, there is the geopolitical limitation not only of disciplines but also of academic disciplining. To argue, as we do, that knowledge and thought are also produced outside of universities and, in dialogue with Hall, that political movements also produce and provoke theoretic moments and movements, is to question and challenge the academic logic and the authority of a universal and singular reasoning and science. We will, through such questioning and challenges, always be marginalized, placed on the fringe, under a microscope, criticized and disputed. Because of this, the challenges that we have encountered have been many. On one hand, there are those challenges that many face in the Latin-American academic context: the real difficulties of financing, infrastructure and research support. On the other hand, are the challenges that come with the traditional academic disciplinary structure, its de-politization and de-subjectification. Here the challenge is to transgress the established norms of neutrality, distance and objectivity. It is also to confront the standards that give little relevance to historically subjugated groups, practices and knowledges, and to the interlinking of race, ethnicity, gender and sexuality with the structures and models of power and knowledge. It is to make evident past and present struggles that give real meaning to the arguments of heterogeneity, decoloniality and inter-culturality. Here the criticism and dispute comes from many sides: from those who describe these efforts as too politicized (and, as such, supposedly less ‘academic’), uni-paradigmatic (supposedly limited to only one ‘line of thought’), fundamentalist (supposedly exclusionary of those subjects not marked by the colonial wound) and as obsessed with conflict (and therefore far from the tradition of ‘culture’, its letters and object of study). These challenges together with the tensions, criticisms and disputes that they mark often times make the path more difficult. Still, and at the same time, they allow us to clarify the distinctive and unique aspects of our project and its motivations to continue with its course of construction, insurgence and struggle. Our concern here is not so much with the institutionalizing of Cultural Studies. Better yet, and in a much broader fashion, we are concerned with epistemic inter-culturalization, with the de-colonialization and pluriversalization of the ‘university’, and with a thinking from the South(s). To place these concerns, as argued here, within a perspective and a politics of naming: ‘(inter)Cultural Studies in de-colonial code,’ is to open, not close, paths. Conclusion In concluding the reflections I have presented here, it is useful to return to a fundamental point touched by Stuart Hall: ‘intervention’. In particular and with Hall, I refer to the will to intervene in and transform the world, an intervention that does not simply relate to social and political contexts and fields, but also to epistemology and theory. That is to an intervention and transformation in and a de-colonization of the frameworks and logics of our thinking, knowing and comprehending. To commit oneself in mind, body and spirit as Frantz Fanon argued. To consider Cultural Studies today a project of political vocation and intervention is to position and at the same time build our work on the borders of and the boundaries between university and society. It is to seriously reflect on whom we read and with whom we want and/or need to dialogue and think, to understand the very limits or our knowledge. And precisely because of this, it is to act on our own situation, establishing contacts and exchanges of different kinds in a pedagogicalmethodological zeal to think from and think with, in what I have elsewhere called a critical inter-culturality and de-colonial pedagogy (Walsh 2009). In universities and societies that are increasingly characterized by nonintervention, auto-complacency, individualism and apathy, intervention represents, suggests and promotes a position and practice of involvement, action and complicity. To take on such a position and practice and to make it an integral part of our political-intellectual project is to find not only ethical meaning in work on culture and power, but also to give this work some heart. That is to say, to focus on the ever-greater need and urgency of life. To call these Cultural Studies or critical (inter)Cultural Studies is only one of our options, and part of the politics of naming.

### 1nc – PIC

#### The United States federal government should normalize its trade relations with the Republic of Cuba with the exception of status quo agriculture sanctions.

#### Lifting sanctions means agribusiness has a free hand to destroy Cuba’s sustainable ag model

Gonzalez, Seattle law professor, 2004

(Carmen, “Whither Goes Cuba? Prospects For Economic & Social Development Part Ii Of Ii: Trade Liberalization, Food Security, and the Environment: The Neoliberal Threat to Sustainable Rural Development”, Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 419, lexis)

The greatest challenge to Cuba's unique agricultural experiment is the eventual renewal of trade relations The greatest challenge to Cuba's unique agricultural experiment is the eventual renewal of trade relations with the United States and the re-integration of Cuba into the global trading system. At the behest of the United States, Cuba was excluded from major trade and financial institutions, including the IMF, the World Bank, and regional trade organizations. n357 Paradoxically, while Cuba's economic isolation produced enormous hardship, it also gave Cuba free rein to respond to the crisis of the Special Period in ways that diverged radically from the prevailing neoliberal model. One of the most significant decisions that Cuba will face after the lifting of the U.S. economic embargo is whether to join the World Bank, the [\*483] IMF, and the Inter-American Development Bank. n358 With an external debt of approximately $ 12 billion as well as an additional $ 15 billion to $ 20 billion debt to Russia, n359 Cuba might be tempted to avail itself of concessional loans and debt restructuring assistance from the IMF and the World Bank in order to normalize relations with external creditors and to obtain badly needed infusions of capital. Debt relief, however, will come at a very high price. Cuba, like other developing countries, will be compelled to implement neoliberal reforms pursuant to structural adjustment programs overseen by the World Bank and the IMF. These programs will require Cuba to maximize the revenues available for debt service by slashing social spending and vigorously promoting exports. In light of Cuba's "comparative advantage" in agricultural production, it is likely that structural adjustment will result in renewed emphasis on sugar production or on the cultivation of non-traditional agricultural exports (such as flowers, fruits, and vegetables). Cuba will be required to prioritize agricultural exports over domestic food production, to drastically reduce subsidies and social safety nets (including agricultural subsidies and food aid), to privatize state lands and government-owned enterprises, and to open its markets to foreign competition. These reforms would be enacted in conjunction with pre-existing commitments under the WTO Agreement on Agriculture to eliminate non-tariff barriers and reduce tariffs, to phase out domestic subsidies, and to eliminate export subsidies. Cuba would also be obligated under the SPS Agreement to permit the cultivation of genetically modified crops unless Cuba could present strict scientific proof that such cultivation will harm human health or the environment. Since such proof is unlikely given scientific uncertainty regarding the effects of genetically modified organisms, it is likely that Cuba, like Argentina, would become a major cultivator of genetically modified crops. Based on the track record of the neoliberal model in the developing world, it appears that Cuba's adoption of the standard package of neoliberal reforms would jeopardize food security at the national level. First, the neoliberal reforms would undercut domestic food production by diverting prime agricultural land to export production and by requiring Cuba to open its markets to cheap, subsidized food from the United States. This would reduce Cuba's food self-sufficiency and would reinstate Cuba's dangerous dependence on food imports to satisfy basic nutritional needs. Second, renewed emphasis on agricultural exports to generate foreign exchange would make Cuba's trade-based entitlements highly vulnerable to fluctuations in world market agricultural prices and to the declining terms of [\*484] trade for agricultural products. In the terminology of entitlements, Cuba's production-based entitlements would be eroded in favor of highly precarious trade-based entitlements. n360 In addition, a significant percentage of Cuba's export earnings would be earmarked for debt service and thus unavailable for investment or for the importation of food and other vital items. Finally, the cultivation of genetically modified crops would reinstate Cuba's trade dependence on the United States (and subordinate Cuba's food security to U.S. political and economic interests) by shutting Cuba out of lucrative EU markets. The neoliberal model would also jeopardize food security at the household level by fueling rural poverty and inequality. The promotion of export production is likely to provoke a land grab by elite Cubans and transnational corporations at the expense of Cuban smallholders. Export production tends to favor wealthy farmers with ready access to capital who can benefit from economies of scale in both production and marketing and can withstand the dramatic price fluctuations that plague many export commodities. n361 Furthermore, the opening of Cuba's markets to cheap food imports from the United States, in conjunction with the slashing of agricultural subsidies and social safety nets, will threaten the livelihoods of the majority of Cuban farmers and produce economic polarization in rural areas. Finally, the cultivation of genetically modified crops is likely to accelerate the dispossession of small farmers by disrupting the traditional practice of saving, sharing, and breeding seeds. As farmers become increasingly dependent on seeds and other inputs produced by transnational corporations, they may suffer severe economic dislocation if input prices increase or if farm revenues drop. Dispossessed farmers are likely to migrate en masse to towns and cities, thereby straining limited urban amenities. In the terminology of [\*485] entitlements, Cuban smallholders are likely to be deprived of production-based entitlements (land with which to grow food), trade-based entitlements (the ability to buy food on the market with the income generated by agricultural production), labor-based entitlements (due to the loss of jobs to mechanization on the large farms), and transfer-based entitlements (state subsidies and food aid). Neoliberal economic reforms may also jeopardize Cuba's experiment in sustainable agriculture. Export production tends to reinforce ecologically unsustainable monocultures that require extensive application of agrochemicals. These monocultures displace traditional food crops that contribute to soil fertility, pest control, and fodder production. The cultivation of genetically modified crops may exacerbate the problems associated with industrial agriculture by reinforcing monocultural production, eroding biodiversity, and increasing the use of herbicides and insecticides (by accelerating resistance to these products). Even if Cuba is able to capture an export niche in the lucrative market for certified organic products, the introduction of genetically modified organisms may undermine Cuba's efforts by producing genetic contamination. Moreover, the cultivation of Bt crops may injure organic farmers by accelerating resistance to one of the most widely used natural pesticides. Finally, if the cultivation of genetically modified crops results in increased use of herbicides and insecticides, this may harm organic agriculture by killing non-target organisms (including the natural enemies of the target pest and other beneficial insects) and by producing ecosystem-wide disturbances. In short, Cuba's adoption of neoliberal economic reforms threatens to recreate colonial and post-colonial patterns of land tenure and production, whereby the ruling elite and transnational corporations grow export crops on large industrial farms while small-scale producers are relegated to marginal subsistence plots or forced to abandon agriculture altogether. Furthermore, the cultivation of genetically modified crops may re-introduce trade dependency on the United States by foreclosing access to the lucrative European market. The prospects for food security and ecological sustainability under neoliberalism are grim. D. Summary and Conclusion: The Symbolic Significance of Cuba The saga of Cuban agriculture illustrates the ways in which developing countries are structurally disadvantaged in the global trading system by the colonial and post-colonial division of labor that relegates them to the production of primary agricultural commodities. Cuba's integration into the world economy as an exporter of sugar and an importer of manufactured goods and food products so deeply constrained its development options that not even a socialist revolution could alter these pre-existing trade and production patterns. It was not until the collapse of the socialist trading bloc and the tightening of the U.S. economic embargo that Cuba was forced by external circumstances to diversify its exports, diversify its trading partners, [\*486] decentralize agricultural production, prioritize domestic food production, and promote organic and semi-organic farming techniques. Cuba is **symbolically important** because it demonstrates that there is an alternative to the dominant export-oriented industrial agricultural model and that this alternative can boost agricultural productivity, enhance food security, and protect the environment. n362 However, the transformation of Cuban agriculture was a response to the crisis of the Special Period and was made possible by Cuba's relative economic isolation. Once the U.S. embargo is lifted and Cuba is reintegrated into the global trading system, Cuba, like every other developing country, will face intense pressure to restructure its economy along neoliberal lines. The results could be devastating. It is therefore important to recognize the neoliberal threat, to consider whether neoliberalism can ever be made compatible with food security and ecological sustainability, and to explore alternative strategies for sustainable rural development.

### 1nc – QPQ

#### “Engagement” requires the provision of positive incentives

Haass 00 – Richard Haass & Meghan O’Sullivan, Brookings Institution Foreign Policy Studies Program, Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy, p. 1-2

The term *engagement* was popularized amid the controversial policy of constructive engagement pursued by the United States toward South Africa during the first term of the Reagan administration. However, the term itself remains a source of confusion. To the Chinese, the word appears to mean simply the conduct of normal relations. In German, no comparable translation exists. Even to native English speakers, the concept behind the word is unclear. Except in the few instances in which the United States has sought to isolate a regime or country, America arguably "engages" states and actors all the time in one capacity or another simply by interacting with them. This book, however, employs the term engagement in a much more specific way, one that involves much more than a policy of nonisolation. In our usage, engagement refers to a foreign policy strategy that depends to a significant degree on positive incentives to achieve its objectives. Certainly, engagement does not preclude the simultaneous use of other foreign policy instruments such as sanctions or military force. In practice, there is often considerable overlap of strategies, particularly when the termination or lifting of sanctions is used as a positive inducement. Yet the distinguishing feature of engagement strategies is their reliance on the extension or provision of incentives to shape the behavior of countries with which the United States has important disagreements.

#### That means the plan must be a quid-pro-quo

De LaHunt 6 - Assistant Director for Environmental Health & Safety Services in Colorado College's Facilities Services department (John, “Perverse and unintended” Journal of Chemical Health and Safety, July-August, Science direct)

Incentives work on a *quid pro quo* basis – this for that. If you change your behavior, I’ll give you a reward. One could say that coercion is an incentive program – do as I say and I’ll let you live. However, I define an incentive as getting something you didn’t have before in exchange for new behavior, so that pretty much puts coercion in its own box, one separate from incentives. But fundamental problems plague the incentive approach. Like coercion, incentives are poor motivators in the long run, for at least two reasons – unintended consequences and perverse incentives.

**Plan isn’t --- voting issue:**

**Limits --- our interp functionally narrows the topic because few cases can defend conditioning—any alternative explodes the negative’s research burden**

**Ground --- locks in core generics like soft power DAs, counterplans to add or remove a condition, and “say no” and backlash arguments**

### Advantage 1:

#### Cuba won’t cooperate after the plan

**Starr, USC IR professor, 2013**

(Pamela, “As Cuba Changes, U.S. Policy Does Not”, May, <https://www.pacificcouncil.org/document.doc?id=539>)

Obstacles to improved bilateral relations, however, are not limited to the U.S. side of the Florida Straits. Our meetings suggested at least three reasons why, despite all their public protestations, the Cuban government may not place an end to the “blockade” at the top of their to-do list: the impact of history; the profound asymmetry of power between the two nations; and the utility of U.S. hostility in unifying the nation against threats to the survival of the Revolution. The history of U.S.-Cuban relations has taught Cuba to be very wary of the United States. Over a half century of hostility has taught each side to mistrust the other, but Cuban suspicion of the United States runs deeper. In part, this is because U.S. policy toward Cuba since 1961 has been geared toward removing the Cuban government from power, and in part it is because of U.S.-Cuban relations even before the Cuban Revolution. From the Cuban perspective, Cuba did not win its independence in 1898, as Americans learn in their history books, but in 1959 as a result of the Revolution. The U.S. goal in the first Cuban War of Independence (what we in the United States call the Spanish-American War) was the separation of Cuba from Spanish colonial domination, followed by its transformation into a de facto colony of the United States. Our Cuban hosts reminded us that the U.S.-imposed Platt Amendment to the Cuban constitution gave the United States the authority to intervene in Cuban politics virtually at will. Furthermore, bilateral economic accords allowed U.S. capital to dominate the production and refining of Cuba’s primary export product, sugar. In the words of Miguel Figueras, “Cuba remained a sugar colony, just of the United States instead of Spain.” Despite the abrogation of the Platt Amendment in 1933, the United States continued to dominate Cuban politics and economy for another quarter century. As a result, the deep poverty, inequality, corruption and repression that characterized Cuba for most of the early 20th century, and which seemed to reach their apogee in the 1950s, has come to be associated with U.S. domination of Cuba. For the delegation, it was not relevant whether or not this was a true reflection of historic fact. What was relevant is that this is how the history of our bilateral relationship is seen from the Cuban perspective and that this understanding of the past informs Cuban engagement with the United States today. Despite evident Cuban fondness for many aspects of American culture (baseball in particular stands out) and their openness to Americans who visit the island, Cubans have no desire to return to their pre-revolutionary past. And given the realities of geography and power, there seems to be a festering undercurrent of concern among Cubans that an uncontrolled opening to the United States could do just this. Indeed, several of our hosts reminded us of the historic U.S. interest, expressed by U.S. politicians from the early 19th century onward, to dominate Cuba and the parallel belief that geography made this both natural and inevitable. This understanding of the history of U.S.-Cuban relations, reinforced by the power asymmetry between our two countries, was clearly reflected in Ambassador Alzugaray’s insistence that Cuba has to be very careful in its dealings with the United States. He argued that this was because “a mistake could prove fatal for Cuba.” He further observed that the United States and Cuba have “never had normal relations” as sovereign equals, so how could we go about constructing them now? The consequence of these apprehensions appears to be an unstated policy of keeping the United States at arm’s length for now. When asked directly what the United States could do to convince Cuba of the sincerity of its desire to improve bilateral relations, the recently retired chief economist for the Ministry of Economy and Planning suggested a series of small confidence-building measures. Ambassador Alzugaray, however, insisted that small steps were not enough. Since the United States is the bigger country, it “needs to make a bigger effort.” The Cuban motivation to prevent a rapid warming in U.S.-Cuban relations also seems to reflect the regime’s historic use of U.S. hostility to unite the country against threats to the Revolution. All of the Cuban academics and former government officials with whom we spoke agreed that the economic and political “updating” of the Cuban system was as essential to the survival of Cuban socialism and its governing structure as it would be difficult to implement. They were convinced that to be successful, the early, critical phase of the reform process had to be undertaken with a Castro in power. This was because, as noted above, only a Castro has the legitimacy to convince Cubans to accept the third massive reorganization of the economy since 1959. Implicit in this opinion is the recognition that such profound economic change will produce opposition which, if not kept in check, could threaten the success of the reforms and thus the survival of the revolutionary project. In this context, U.S. hostility is apt to remain a useful if not essential tool for mitigating opposition to reform during the first and most difficult years of the process. This reading of the Cuban attitude toward the United States was reinforced by a recitation of the history of Cuban responses to U.S. attempts to reduce bilateral hostility provided by the Chief of the U.S. Mission in Cuba, John Caulfield. We were reminded that President Ford’s efforts to reduce tensions were greeted by Cuba’s decision to send troops to Angola. Carter’s efforts to normalize relations were greeted by the Mariel boatlift. Clinton’s were met by the shooting down of a Brothers to the Rescue plane. Finally, most recently, Obama efforts were greeted by the arrest and imprisonment of a USAID contractor on charges of espionage. Although Caulfield did not explicitly connect the dots, his meaning was clear: Alan Gross was likely arrested either to prevent any reduction in tensions between the two countries or because improving ties with the United States is simply not that important to Cuba. Whatever the reason for Alan Gross’ arrest, it is clear that Cuba is not preoccupied with encouraging the United States to end the embargo. Time and again we were told that economic reform is Cuba’s number one priority—the United States is not. The two countries do cooperate—on hurricane tracking, drug trafficking, migration, and preparing for potential gulf oil spills—but extending and improving bilateral cooperation is not high on the Cuban foreign policy agenda. Instead, Cuban foreign policy continues to emphasize efforts to maintain Cuban sovereignty and identity, which Ambassador Alzugaray noted have historically been most directly threatened by the United States. It is now charged with supporting the economic reform process by promoting foreign direct investment and the diversification of Cuban economic ties. In this context, the only potential role for the United States in the coming years that was mentioned by our Cuban hosts is the growing role of Cuban-American investment in Cuba.

#### Lifting the embargo destroys Cuban health care

**Garrett, CFR global health senior fellow, 2012**

(Laurie, “Castrocare in Crisis Will Lifting the Embargo Make Things Worse?”, August, ebsco)

According to Steven Ullmann of the University of Miami's Cuba Transition Project, if Washington lifts its embargo, Cuba can expect a mass exodus of health-care workers and then the creation of a domestic health system with two tiers, one private and one public. The system's lower, public tier would be at risk of complete collapse. Ullmann therefore suggests "fostering this [public] system through partnerships and enhanced compensation of personnel." He also argues that officials in both governments should "limit out-migration of scientific brainpower from the country." Properly handled, the transition could leave Cuba with a mixed health-care economy -- part public, part locally owned and private, and part outsourced and private -- that could compensate Cuban physicians, nurses, and other health-care workers enough to keep them in the country and working at least part time in the public sector. The only U.S. policy currently in place, however, encourages Cuban physicians to immigrate to the United States. In 2006, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security created a special parole program under which health-care workers who defect from Cuba are granted legal residence in the United States while they prepare for U.S. medical licensing examinations. An estimated 2,000 physicians have taken advantage of the program. Although few have managed to gain accreditation as U.S. doctors, largely due to their poor English-language skills and the stark differences between Cuban and U.S. medical training, many now work as nurses in Florida hospitals. The Castro government, meanwhile, is in a seemingly untenable position. The two greatest achievements of the Cuban Revolution -- 100 percent literacy and quality universal health care -- depend on huge streams of government spending. If Washington does eventually start to normalize relations, plugging just a few holes in the embargo wall would require vast additional spending by the Cuban government. The government would have to pay higher salaries to teachers, doctors, nurses, and technicians; strengthen the country's deteriorating infrastructure; and improve working conditions for common workers. To bolster its health-care infrastructure and create incentives for Cuban doctors to stay in the system, Cuba will have to find external support from donors, such as the United Nations and the U.S. Agency for International Development. But few sources will support Havana with funding as long as the regime restricts the travel of its citizens.In the long run, Cuba will need to develop a taxable economic base to generate government revenues -- which would mean inviting foreign investment and generating serious employment opportunities. The onus is on the Castro government to demonstrate how the regime could adapt to the easing or lifting of the U.S. embargo. Certainly, Cuban leaders already know that their health triumphs would be at risk. The United States, too, has tough responsibilities. How the U.S. government handles its side of the post-embargo transition will have profound ramifications for the people of Cuba. The United States could allow the marketplace to dictate events, resulting in thousands of talented professionals leaving Cuba and dozens of U.S. companies building a vast offshore for-profit empire of medical centers along Cuba's beaches. But it could and should temper the market's forces by enacting regulations and creating incentives that would bring a rational balance to the situation.

#### No scenario for superbugs- virulence trades off with transmissibility

**Orent, anthropologist specializing in evolutionary epidemiology, 2005**

(Wendy, “Bird bug has flown the coop”, 10-23, lexis, ldg)

Transmissibility is the ability of the virus to get out of one host and into another. In order to do so, the virus has to do something to the host to get itself shed. People act like transmissibility is just some little quirk of the genome, but what it really is, is the ability of the virus to colonize tissues, say, in the upper airways so that you sneeze or cough, and the virus is shed in large quantities. . . . You might go to work one day not feeling terribly well. You try not to sneeze all over everywhere. But flu is extraordinarily transmissible. It's these tiny, tiny particles that just fly off in a big cloud [when an infected person sneezes] and spread very easily. . . . So flu depends on keeping you out there --- going to work, you know, going to school, sitting on a bus --- if it's going to spread. It has to keep the host relatively healthy. A host can't keel over and die. Think about how ebola doesn't spread because it's so lethal that it just kills you right off. And certain forms of plague can do that, too. **They kill you very quickly so there's no chance for the bug to spread**. . . . So if transmissibility increases, the virulence should decrease, because the virus needs to keep you mobile to get you to transmit it. If you think about it, it's just Darwinian logic. **If you're too sick to transmit the disease, it dies with you**.

#### Turn- war causes epidemic disease outbreak

**Fidler, Indiana University School of Law associate law professor, 1997**

(David P., “Return of the Fourth Horseman: Emerging Infectious Diseases and International Law”, April, 81 Minn. L. Rev. 77 1, lexis, ldg)

Historically, war has been conducive to infectious diseases by **creating conditions ripe for** outbreaks. While the prospects for traditional interstate war are probably smaller in the post-Cold War era, social unrest and civil war are currently prominent issues in international relations. With civil unrest and war come the breakdown of political authority, public health services and facilities, and large movements of refugees that **generate a rich environment for infectious diseases**. n142 Infectious diseases do not require, however, actual military conflict to cause epidemics in unsettled countries. For example, the harsh economic and social transitions to democracy and capitalism underway in the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union triggered a diptheria epidemic that, according to WHO, threatened to spin out of control into a global public health emergency. n143

#### Their authors have a financial and institutional bias for alarmism

**Canberra Times, 2010**

(“Swine Flu Who Should We Trust?”, 2-6, lexis, ldg)

It's also timely in the light of a series of recent developments that might have undermined public trust in official responses to pandemic influenza. While we were marking Australia Day, Keiji Fukuda, the special adviser on pandemic influenza to the director-general of the World Health Organisation, was responding to allegations that WHO had ''faked'' a pandemic on the basis of overly close ties with companies that make influenza vaccines and treatments. The chairman of the council's health committee, Wolfgang Wodarg, a German epidemiologist turned MP, told the hearing that about $US18billion ($A20 billion) had been spent on the pandemic worldwide and that millions were vaccinated ''for no good reason''. Wodarg said, ''The definition of a pandemic was changed by the WHO last May. It was only this change of definition which made it possible to transform a run-of-the-mill flu into a worldwide pandemic and made it possible for the pharmaceutical industry to transform this opportunity into cash, under contracts which were mainly secret.'' Equally critical was Ulrich Keil, the director of the WHO Collaborating Centre for Epidemiology at the University of Munster in Germany. ''We are witnessing a gigantic misallocation of resources in terms of public health,'' he told the hearing. A day later, in Canada's Globe and Mail newspaper, two senior doctors wrote that the ''ballyhoo'' over the swine flu was due to the WHO's ''rigid adherence to pre-existing pandemic plans'' rather than to any conspiracy theory involving pharmaceutical companies, though the consequences were no less serious. Richard Schabas, a former chief medical officer of health in Ontario, and Neil Rau, an infectious diseases specialist at the University of Toronto, argued that WHO had made a subtle but important change in its definition of pandemic. They wrote, ''It dropped the key requirements that a pandemic virus had to be completely novel an antigenic shift and cause widespread and severe disease. Almost immediately, as luck had it, a virus appeared that [fitted] the new pandemic definition but not the old one.'' The Canadian doctors said the H1N1 outbreak peaked in their neck of the woods in October, and disease rates dropped off rapidly in North America. ''Any benefit from immunising healthy people had virtually vanished by mid-November, the very time when the vaccine became readily available to all,'' they wrote. ''Speculation about a serious 'third wave' is fading fast, as high population levels of immunity make it implausible.'' But instead of spreading this good news, they say, ''the current risk is exaggerated to justify ongoing futile vaccination efforts directed at the worried well''. The JAMA article on trust was written by two public health experts with a long experience in the complexities of public health communication: Heidi J. Larson, a social anthropologist from the Institute for Global Health at Imperial College in London, who has advised the WHO and many agencies, and David L. Heymann, a physician who heads the Centre on Global Health Security at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine and chairs Britain's Health Protection Agency. According to Larson and Heymann, trust in public health messages is built long before it is put to the test in situations such as the swine flu pandemic. It may be influenced by personal experiences and a variety of historical factors, including previous vaccine safety scares and the way governments have managed other public health problems. The legacy of the British minister who chomped on a hamburger while insisting there was no threat of mad cow disease in good old British beef, undoubtedly lives on. But the article omitted some critical issues that other experts use to help explain the varying degrees of trust built up by governments and official health policy organisations. These include the fact that public trust in the integrity of medicine generally not only vaccines has taken a hammering in recent years following one scandal after another surrounding poor professional conduct and ties to the pharmaceutical industry. Some of these scandals the overly enthusiastic promotions of hormone replacement therapy and the arthritis drug Vioxx are prime examples caused significant harm.Vaccines are one of the holy cows of public health. In some quarters, the suggestion that conflicts of interest might be an issue for researchers or doctors in this field is tantamount to heresy. Some people in the field believe that such issues should not even be aired in public, in case they feed the campaigns and conspiracy theories of a small but active minority who are often dismissed as ''anti-vaccinationists''. And yet it is an issue that merits serious investigation, according to a United States report which found that the major player in the fields in the US, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, has been doing a poor job of screening medical experts for conflicts of interest when they are providing advice on vaccines. Most of the experts who served on advisory panels to evaluate vaccines for flu and cervical cancer in 2007 had potential conflicts that were not properly managed. Much of the discussion around conflicts of interest focuses on commercial ties, but they can be more subtle. If your career is built on the back of influenza research, for example, then there is also a professional imperative to highlight the importance of your work (and the need to fund it). Another, related factor which undoubtedly has some bearing on the community's response to pandemic policy is growing awareness of ''disease mongering'' efforts by the medical industry, whether drug and device manufacturers or service providers, to **exaggerate or overstate** the impact of a whole range of health conditions and diseases, to drum up business.

### Advantage 2:

#### No solvency— multiple barriers prevent Cuban ag expansion

Kost 04

William Kost is an Agricultural Economist with ERS, u.s.. Department of Agriculture

UBAN AGRICULTURE: TO BE OR NOT TO BE ORGANIC?

<http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume14/pdfs/kost.pdf>

In spite of successes, Cuba’s urban agriculture program faces several problems that limit further expansion. Seed shortages continue. Land remains in short¶ supply. Soil quality of available land is low. Many¶ years of spilled pollutants¶ have contaminated much¶ of the available urban land. Significant portions of¶ land are covered with litter. The major problem, and¶ the hardest to address, continues to be a fresh water¶ shortage. This shortage is further compounded by¶ Cuba’s dilapidated infrastructure, which constrains¶ movement of available water, and the lack of energy¶ needed to power pumps.

#### The impact is exaggerated – Cuban ag isn’t sustainable

Thompson and Stephens, 12 – \* Ph.D. Curriculum and Education Director @ Duke University AND \*\* Marian Cheek Jackson Center (Charles D. and Alexander, “Visions for Sustainable Agriculture in Cuba and the United States: Changing Minds and Models through Exchange”, Southern States, March 22 2013, <http://www.southernspaces.org/2012/visions-sustainable-agriculture-cuba-and-united-states-changing-minds-and-models-through-exchan>) //SP

Following the Cuban Revolution (1953–59), the Soviet Union’s (USSR) agricultural imperatives drove the island toward state-run farms, marginalizing many family run operations. The breakup of the USSR in 1990 spelled the end of Soviet agricultural influence but intensified Cuban food shortages. Cuba began to look within for solutions, finding indigenous knowledge and encouraging local innovation. Exaggerated praise for developments in the country’s sustainable agriculture belies the reality that Cuba is no utopia. Popular descriptions often oversimplify the narrative of Cuba’s sustainable agriculture. For example, the website of the Durham, North Carolina, non-profit NEEM (Natural Environment Ecological Management) features a narrative sketch that labels the rise of organic garden collectives in Cuban cities "the urban agriculture miracle."5 Others have suggested that we can expect "an ecological agriculture" in Cuba’s future.6 In much sustainable agriculture praise of Cuba, we do not hear that the country (like the U.S.) has confinement hog and chicken houses, that major U.S. food conglomerates are already selling vast quantities of grain and other products there, or that the embargo on trade with Cuba does not apply to U.S. agribusiness. We are not told that thousands work in small farming because they have no other option. Agricultural work is popular in Cuba, in part, because state-supported income is drying up for hundreds of thousands of wage earners and there is often nowhere else to turn but to small-scale farms and gardens. Yet much of Cuba’s former sugarcane land, once a volatile but powerful economic life-force, is idle and in poor condition. Even with its admirable innovations in sustainable and organic farming, Cuba’s domestic agricultural producers cannot meet the food needs of the island’s population; there is a real sense of food insecurity. Looking for food (in dollar stores, on the black market, legally), is a major pre-occupation for much of the population. Cuba imports at least 80 percent of its food, with much of it coming from its largest trading partners—China and Venezuela. This is hardly a sustainable scenario, and while there does not appear to be starvation in Cuba, food shortages remain a problem, even as the government’s meager food rationing is fading.7 However, household food insecurity is also on the rise in the U.S. today. According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture at least 14.5% of U.S. households were food insecure at some time during the year in 2010, up from 11% in 2005.

#### Status quo solves: other countries are beginning to adopt the Cuban model now

Friedman**,** New York Times,2012

(Noah, “Urban Agriculture in Cuba (Photo Essay)”, 10-18, https://nacla.org/news/2012/10/18/urban-agriculture-cuba-photo-essay)

Cubans see their urban agriculture movement as a possible solution as the world begins to grapple with increasing prices and demand for food and fuel. Many other countries have begun to use the Cuban experience as a model as locally grown, organic produce becomes more popular worldwide. In 2007, Fidel Castro warned in the first published essay after his illness: "More than three billion people in the world are being condemned to a premature death from hunger and thirst" by diverting food crops to biofuels. In the past four years, food prices have indeed skyrocketed and a 2011 report by Oxfam identifies biofuel production as a principal cause of food insecurity. Some Cubans see their urban agriculture movement as a possible solution as the world begins to grapple with increasing prices and demand for food and fuel: "There is an ecological trend, a green philosophy. This is an urgent call, an immediate future; the large urban centers, with the problems of oil production and the transport of goods, this could be a worldwide solution as it has been in Cuba. We have the advantage of having gone through what other countries may experience in 50 years,” says Miguel Salcines Lopez, President of Havana’s largest urban agriculture cooperative, Vivero Alamar. Beginning with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, Cuba entered a period of extreme shortages that came to be known as "The Special Period." With imports such as food, fuel, pesticides, and fertilizers disappearing almost overnight, Cubans began to grow their own produce wherever they could—balconies, empty lots, and roof-tops. Initially these were grassroots initiatives born of necessity, but over the next decade they would become a central tenet of state planning and a pillar for the island's economy. A homage to the history of Cuban urban agriculture in the home of Oscar Aleman Perez in Havana. In the 1970s and '80s, Raul Castro, as Defense Minister, encouraged the development of urban agriculture and oversaw experimental organic farming in military facilities. In those days, the organoponicos, as they came to be known, were introduced in preparation for a possible worldwide embargo of Cuba; today they are a training ground and growth area for Raul Castro's economic reforms that allow for more small business. In 1994, the Ministry of Agriculture institutionalized urban agriculture initiatives under one umbrella. Projects from informal family gardens (huertos), to large cooperatives (organoponicos), to state-owned gardens would all receive assistance from the ministry, which sought to provide free land to residents for gardens, through support in the start-up phase, providing seed banks, and overseeing hundreds of horticultural clubs for information exchange. Many Cubans assumed that as the shortages of the 1990s faded, so too would urban agriculture, but instead it has expanded in the last decade. Indeed, many other countries have begun to use the Cuban experience as a model as locally grown, organic produce becomes more popular worldwide. Of the recently released linamientos, or guidelines, for economic and social reforms in Cuba, 12 refer to urban agriculture. Number 174 states the necessity of increasing agricultural initiatives that can substitute for food imports, “with emphasis in the execution of the urban agriculture program, which should be extended to the entire country.”

#### Dangerous climate change inevitable-most comprehensive accounts.

**Anderson et al., Tyndall Centre for Climate Change research professor, 2011**

(Kevin, “Beyond ‘dangerous’ climate change: emission scenarios for a new world”, Phil. Trans. R. Soc. A January 13, 2011 369 20-44, ldg)

In relation to the ﬁrst two issues, the Copenhagen Accord and many other high level policy statements are unequivocal in both their recognition of 2 ◦ C as the appropriate delineator between acceptable and dangerous climate change and the need to remain at or below 2 ◦ C. Despite such clarity, those providing policy advice frequently take a much less categorical position, although the implications of their more nuanced analyses are rarely communicated adequately to policy makers. Moreover, given that it is a ‘political’ interpretation of the severity of impacts that informs where the threshold between acceptable and dangerous climate change resides, the recent reassessment of these impacts upwards suggests current analyses of mitigation signiﬁcantly underestimate what is necessary to avoid dangerous climate change [20,21]. Nevertheless, and despite the evident logic for revising the 2 ◦ C threshold, 31 there is little political appetite and limited academic support for such a revision. In stark contrast, many academics and wider policy advisers undertake their analyses of mitigation with relatively high probabilities of exceeding 2 ◦ C and consequently risk entering a prolonged period of what can now reasonably be described as extremely dangerous climate change. 32 Put bluntly, while the rhetoric of policy is to reduce emissions in line with avoiding dangerous climate change, most policy advice is to accept a high probability of extremely dangerous climate change rather than propose radical and immediate emission reductions. 33 This already demanding conclusion becomes even more challenging when assumptions about the rates of viable emission reductions are considered alongside an upgrading of the severity of impacts for 2 ◦ C. Within global emission scenarios, such as those developed by Stern [6], the CCC [8] and ADAM [47], annual rates of emission reduction beyond the peak years are constrained to levels thought to be compatible with economic growth—normally 3 per cent to 4 per cent per year. However, on closer examination these analyses suggest such reduction rates are no longer sufﬁcient to avoid dangerous climate change. For example, in discussing arguments for and against carbon markets the CCC state ‘rich developed economies need to start demonstrating that a low-carbon economy is possible and compatible with economic prosperity’ [8, p. 160]. However, given the CCC acknowledge ‘it is not now possible to ensure with high likelihood that a temperature rise of more than 2 ◦ C is avoided’ and given the view that reductions in emissions in excess of 3–4% per year are not compatible with economic growth, the CCC are, in effect, conceding that avoiding dangerous (and even extremely dangerous) climate change is no longer compatible with economic prosperity. In prioritizing such economic prosperity over avoiding extremely dangerous climate change, the CCC, Stern, ADAM and similar analyses suggest they are guided by what is feasible. 34 However, while in terms of emission reduction rates their analyses favour the ‘challenging though still feasible’ end of orthodox assessments, the approach they adopt in relation to peaking dates is very different. All premise their principal analyses and economic assessments on the ‘infeasible’ assumption of global emissions peaking between 2010 and 2016; a profound departure from the more ‘feasible’ assumptions framing the majority of such reports. The scale of this departure is further emphasized when disaggregating global emissions into Annex 1 and non-Annex 1 nations, as the scenario pathways developed within this paper demonstrate. Only if Annex 1 nations reduce emissions immediately 35 at rates far beyond those typically countenanced and only then if non-Annex 1 emissions peak between 2020 and 2025 before reducing at unprecedented rates, do global emissions peak by 2020. Consequently, the 2010 global peak central to many integrated assessment model scenarios as well as the 2015–2016 date enshrined in the CCC, Stern and ADAM analyses, do not reﬂect any orthodox ‘feasibility’. By contrast, the logic of such studies suggests (extremely) dangerous climate change can only be avoided if economic growth is exchanged, at least temporarily, for a period of planned austerity within Annex 1 nations 36 and a rapid transition away from fossil-fuelled development within non-Annex 1 nations. The analysis within this paper offers a stark and unremitting assessment of the climate change challenge facing the global community. There is now little to no chance of maintaining the rise in global mean surface temperature at below 2 ◦ C, despite repeated high-level statements to the contrary. Moreover, the impacts associated with 2 ◦ C have been revised upwards (e.g. [20,21]), sufﬁciently so that 2 ◦ C now more appropriately represents the threshold between dangerous and extremely dangerous climate change. Consequently, and with tentative signs of global emissions returning to their earlier levels of growth, 2010 represents a political tipping point. The science of climate change allied with emission pathways for Annex 1 and non-Annex 1 nations suggests a profound departure in the scale and scope of the mitigation and adaption challenge from that detailed in many other analyses, particularly those directly informing policy.

#### Zero chance the US adopts the Cuban model

Pfeiffer, 3 – energy editor for From the Wilderness (Dale, “Cuba-A Hope”, From the Wilderness,

<http://www.fromthewilderness.com/free/ww3/120103_korea_2.html>.

Resistance to Cuban-style agricultural reform would be particularly stiff in the United States.Agribusiness will not allow all of its holdings and power to be expropriated. Nor is the U.S. government interested in small farms and organic agriculture. The direction of U.S. agriculture is currently towards more advanced technology, greater fossil fuel dependency, and less sustainability. The ability of small farmers and urban gardens to turn a profit is effectively drowned outby the overproduction of agribusiness.

### Framing:

#### Nuclear war causes extinction – here’s the most qualified, recent evidence

Starr ’10 – director of the University of Missouri's Clinical Laboratory Science Program

[Steven, “The climatic consequences of nuclear war”, March 12, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/the-climatic-consequences-of-nuclear-war]

This isn't a question to be avoided. Recent scientific studies PDF have found that a war fought with the deployed U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals would leave Earth virtually uninhabitable. In fact, NASA computer models have shown that even a "successful" first strike by Washington or Moscow would inflict catastrophic environmental damage that would make agriculture impossible and cause mass starvation. Similarly, in the January Scientific American, Alan Robock and Brian Toon, the foremost experts on the climatic impact of nuclear war, warn that the environmental consequences of a "regional" nuclear war would cause a global famine that could kill one billion people. Their article, "Local Nuclear War: Global Suffering," PDF predicts that the detonation of 100 15-kiloton nuclear weapons in Indian and Pakistani megacities would create urban firestorms that would loft 5 million tons of thick, black smoke above cloud level. (This smoke would engulf the entire planet within 10 days.) Because the smoke couldn't be rained out, it would remain in the stratosphere for at least a decade and have profoundly disruptive effects. Specifically, the smoke layer would block sunlight, heat the upper atmosphere, and cause massive destruction of protective stratospheric ozone. A 2008 study PDF calculated ozone losses (after the described conflict) of 25-45 percent above mid-latitudes and 50-70 percent above northern high latitudes persisting for five years, with substantial losses continuing for another five years. Such severe ozone depletion would allow intense levels of harmful ultraviolet light to reach Earth's surface--even with the stratospheric smoke layer in place. Beneath the smoke, the loss of warming sunlight would produce average surface temperatures colder than any experienced in the last 1,000 years. There would be a corresponding shortening of growing seasons by up to 30 days and significant reductions in average rainfall in many areas, with a 40-percent decrease of precipitation in the Asian monsoon region. Basically, the Earth's surface would become cold, dark, and dry. Humans have had some experience with this sort of deadly global climate change. In 1815, the largest volcanic eruption in recorded history took place in Indonesia. Mount Tambora exploded and created a stratospheric layer of sulfuric acid droplets that blocked sunlight from reaching Earth. During the following year, which was known as "The Year without Summer," the northeastern United States experienced snowstorms in June and debilitating frosts every month of the year. In an earlier study PDF, Robock, Toon, and their colleagues predicted that the decreases in average surface temperatures following the nuclear conflict described above would be 2-3 times colder than those experienced in 1816 and that the black soot produced by subsequent nuclear firestorms would remain in the stratosphere five times longer than the acid clouds from volcanic eruptions. In other words, 10 years after a regional nuclear war, Earth's average surface temperatures would still be as cold, or colder, than they were in 1816. Most likely, the long-lived smoke layer would produce a "decade without a summer." Here it's important to point out that the 100 Hiroshima-size weapons detonated in Robock and Toon's regional war scenario contain less than 1 percent of the combined explosive power in the 7,000 or so operational and deployed nuclear weapons the United States and Russia possess. If even one-half of these weapons were detonated in urban areas, Robock and Toon have predicted that the resulting nuclear darkness would cause daily minimum temperatures to fall below freezing in the largest agricultural areas of the Northern Hemisphere for a period of between one to three years. Meanwhile, average global surface temperatures would become colder than those experienced 18,000 years ago at the height of the last Ice Age. Amazingly, however, no follow-up studies have been initiated to further evaluate the decreases in temperature, precipitation, or ozone depletion predicted to arise from either regional or strategic nuclear war. Large studies were conducted in the 1980s on "nuclear winter" by the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, the World Meteorological Organization, and the International Council for Science's Scientific Committee on Problems of the Environment. But given that Robock and Toon's new research has found that these early studies significantly underestimated the climatic and environmental consequences of nuclear war, wouldn't it make sense for such groups to now revisit the subject? At the very least, Washington and Moscow, with 95 percent of the world's nuclear weapons, should be required to investigate the environmental and climatic consequences from a nuclear war created by their nuclear arsenals. Moreover, in the United States, there appears to be a legal basis to force the Defense Department to evaluate the likely consequences of its nuclear arsenal. According to the EPA's website, "The National Environmental Policy Act [NEPA] requires federal agencies to integrate environmental values into their decision-making processes by considering the environmental impacts of their proposed actions and reasonable alternatives to those actions. To meet NEPA requirements, federal agencies [must] prepare a detailed statement known as an Environmental Impact Statement." If that's the case, why not require Defense to create an Environmental Impact Statement for the more than 1,000 U.S. strategic nuclear weapons now on high-alert? To date, the discussion of a nuclear-weapons-free world has included no mention of the environmental consequences of nuclear war. I fear that without such a dialogue, the debate lacks the sense of urgency required to change the nuclear status quo. That's why I believe that a wake-up call from the scientific community is seriously needed. Regardless of how "safe from use" U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons are considered to be, they still could wipe out humanity. Thus, the recognition by Washington that its nuclear arsenal, if used in conflict, will make the whole world--including all of its territory--uninhabitable, is long overdue.

#### Deterrence doesn’t check.

Krieger 2009 **–** professor of politics (David, September 4th, “Still loving the Bomb After All these Years” Nuclear Age Peace Foundation <https://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2009/09/04_krieger_newsweek_response.php?krieger>)Tepperman builds upon Waltz’s logic, and concludes “that all states are rational,” even though their leaders may have a lot of bad qualities, including being “stupid, petty, venal, even evil….”  He asks us to trust that rationality will always prevail when there is a risk of nuclear retaliation, because these weapons make “the costs of war obvious, inevitable, and unacceptable.”  Actually, he is asking us to do more than trust in the rationality of leaders; he is asking us to gamble the future on this proposition.  “The iron logic of deterrence and mutually assured destruction is so compelling,” Tepperman argues, “it’s led to what’s known as the nuclear peace….”  But if this is a peace worthy of the name, which it isn’t, it certainly is not one on which to risk the future of civilization.  One irrational leader with control over a nuclear arsenal could start a nuclear conflagration, resulting in a global Hiroshima. Tepperman celebrates “the iron logic of deterrence,” but deterrence is a theory that is far from rooted in “iron logic.”  It is a theory based upon threats that must be effectively communicated and believed.  Leaders of Country A with nuclear weapons must communicate to other countries (B, C, etc.) the conditions under which A will retaliate with nuclear weapons.  The leaders of the other countries must understand and believe the threat from Country A will, in fact, be carried out.  The longer that nuclear weapons are not used, the more other countries may come to believe that they can challenge Country A with impunity from nuclear retaliation.  The more that Country A bullies other countries, the greater the incentive for these countries to develop their own nuclear arsenals.  Deterrence is unstable and therefore precarious. Most of the countries in the world reject the argument, made most prominently by Kenneth Waltz, that the spread of nuclear weapons makes the world safer.  These countries joined together in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, but they never agreed to maintain indefinitely a system of nuclear apartheid in which some states possess nuclear weapons and others are prohibited from doing so.  The principal bargain of the NPT requires the five NPT nuclear weapons states (US, Russia, UK, France and China) to engage in good faith negotiations for nuclear disarmament, and the International Court of Justice interpreted this to mean complete nuclear disarmament in all its aspects.  Tepperman finds that when viewed from his “nuclear optimist” perspective, “nuclear weapons start to seem a lot less frightening.”  “Nuclear peace,” he tells us, “rests on a scary bargain: you accept a small chance that something extremely bad will happen in exchange for a much bigger chance that something very bad – conventional war – won’t happen.”  But the “extremely bad” thing he asks us to accept is the end of the human species.  Yes, that would be serious.  He also doesn’t make the case that in a world without nuclear weapons, the prospects of conventional war would increase dramatically.  After all, it is only an unproven supposition that nuclear weapons have prevented wars, or would do so in the future.  We have certainly come far too close to the precipice of catastrophic nuclear war. As an ultimate celebration of the faulty logic of deterrence, Tepperman calls for providing any nuclear weapons state with a “survivable second strike option.”  Thus, he not only favors nuclear weapons, but finds the security of these weapons to trump human security.   Presumably he would have President Obama providing new and secure nuclear weapons to North Korea, Pakistan and any other nuclear weapons states that come along so that they will feel secure enough not to use their weapons in a first-strike attack.  Do we really want to bet the human future that Kim Jong-Il and his successors are more rational than Mr. Tepperman?

#### Yes miscalc

Ferguson 2008 - sr. fellow @ the Hoover Institute and professor of History @ Harvard (Niall, Hoover Digest no1 47-53 Wint 2008)

The risk of a major geopolitical crisis in 2007 is certainly lower than it was in 1914. Yet it is not so low as to lie altogether beyond the realm of probability. The escalation of violence in the Middle East as Iraq disintegrates and Iran presses on with its nuclear program is close to being a certainty, as are the growing insecurity of Israel and the impossibility of any meaningful U.S. exit from the region. All may be harmonious between the United States and China today, yet the potential for tension over trade and exchange rates has unquestionably increased since the Democrats gained control of Congress. Nor should we forget about security flashpoints such as the independence of Taiwan, the threat of North Korea, and the nonnuclear status of Japan. To consign political risk to the realm of uncertainty seems almost as rash today as it was in the years leading up the First World War. Anglo-German economic commercial ties reached a peak in 1914, but geopolitics trumped economics. It often does.

#### Nuclear war causes extinction

SGR 2003 - Scientists for Global Responsibility (Newsletter, “Does anybody remember the Nuclear Winter?” July 27, <http://www.sgr.org.uk/climate/NuclearWinter_NL27.htm>)

Obviously, when a nuclear bomb hits a target, it causes a massive amount of devastation, with the heat, blast and radiation killing tens or hundreds of thousands of people instantly and causing huge damage to infrastructure. But in addition to this, a nuclear explosion throws up massive amounts of dust and smoke. For example, a large nuclear bomb bursting at ground level would throw up about a million tonnes of dust. As a consequence of a nuclear war, then, the dust and the smoke produced would block out a large fraction of the sunlight and the sun's heat from the earth's surface, so it would quickly become be dark and cold - temperatures would drop by something in the region of 10-20ºC - many places would feel like they were in an arctic winter. It would take months for the sunlight to get back to near normal. The drop in light and temperature would quickly kill crops and other plant and animal life while humans, already suffering from the direct effects of the war, would be vulnerable to malnutrition and disease on a massive scale. In the case of an (e.g.) accidental nuclear exchange between the USA and Russia, the main effects would be felt in the northern hemisphere, as the dust and smoke would quickly circulate across this area. But even in this case, it would soon affect the tropics - where crops and other plant/ animal life are especially sensitive to cold. Hence, even in these areas there would be major problems.